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Abstract:	  Diversified	  business	  groups,	  consisting	  of	   legally	   independent	  firms	  operating	  
across	  diverse	  industries,	  are	  ubiquitous	  in	  emerging	  markets.	  Groups	  around	  the	  world	  
share	   certain	   attributes	   but	   also	   vary	   substantially	   in	   structure,	   ownership,	   and	   other	  
dimensions.	   This	  paper	  proposes	   a	  business	   group	   taxonomy,	  which	   is	   used	   to	   formu-­‐	  
late	  hypotheses	  and	  present	  evidence	  about	  the	  reasons	  for	  the	  formation,	  prevalence,	  
and	   evolution	   of	   groups	   in	   different	   environments.	   In	   interpreting	   the	   evidence,	   the	  
authors	  pay	  particular	  attention	  to	  two	  aspects	  neglected	  in	  much	  of	  the	  literature:	  the	  
circumstances	  under	  which	  groups	  emerge	  and	  the	  historical	  evidence	  on	  some	  of	   the	  
questions	  addressed	  by	   recent	  studies.	  They	  argue	  that	  business	  groups	  are	   responses	  
to	  different	  economic	   conditions	  and	   that,	   from	  a	  welfare	   standpoint,	   they	   can	   some-­‐	  
times	   be	   “paragons”	   and,	   at	   other	   times,	   “parasites.”	   The	   authors	   conclude	   with	   an	  
agenda	  for	  future	  research.	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1 Introduction
Diversified business (or corporate) groups are ubiquitous in emerging
markets (e.g., Brazil, Chile, China, India, Indonesia, South Korea, Mexico,
Pakistan, Thailand, and many more) and even in some developed economies
(e.g., Italy, Sweden). These groups typically consist of legally independent
firms, operating in multiple (often unrelated) industries, which are bound
together by persistent formal (e.g., equity) and informal (e.g., family) ties.
Varying degrees of participation by outside investors characterize many
business groups around the world. Table 1 suggests that, in all countries
for which data are available, the fraction of firms classified by domestic
sources as group affiliated is substantial, ranging from about a fifth in Chile
to about two-thirds in Indonesia. The table also indicates that, in virtually
all emerging markets, group affiliated firms tend to be relatively large and
economically important.
But groups around the world vary considerably in form: some are ex-
tremely diversified whereas others are more focused. In some groups there
is considerable vertical integration and intragroup trade; in others, less.
Some groups are deeply involved in banking and financial services, whereas
others are not. Some of this diversity is illustrated in Table 2, which dis-
plays partial data on the extent of group diversification, vertical integration,
and involvement in financial services in nine emerging markets.1 Groups in
Chile, for example, are far more diversified than groups in South Korea,
which, in turn, are more diversified than groups in Taiwan; groups in the
Philippines are far more vertically integrated than groups in India and far
more involved in financial services than groups in Thailand. Moving from
structure to ownership and control, some business groups are vertically con-
trolled (“pyramids”), whereas others are horizontally linked through cross
shareholdings. The extent of family involvement also varies considerably
across groups. Finally, in certain countries, business groups are a politically
important force, enjoying close relations with the government; in others the
relations between groups and governments tend to be more turbulent.
The ubiquity and diversity of business groups make the study of this
institution fascinating. Conceptually, this hybrid organizational form be-
tween firm and market can shed new light on the theory of the firm and its
boundaries. Empirically, the ubiquity of business groups outside the United
States and the United Kingdom makes them relevant to a variety of fields
1 Group diversification is measured by the number of two-digit industries in which the
group operates. Vertical integration is measured as follows: Group firms are classified
into two-digit ISIC industries and, for each pair of firms (x, y), we observe the fraction of
inputs from xaˆs industry to yaˆs and vice versa. We then record the higher value for each
pair and average over all pairs in the group to obtain the groupaˆs vertical integration
index. Involvement in financial services is measured as the fraction of all group assets in
group financial firms. See Khanna and Yafeh (2005) for further details on these measures.
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Table 1 - Group Affiliation Around the World
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TABLE 1 
GROUP  AFFILIATION AROUND  THE  WORLD 
 
  
Years 
of 
data 
 
Number 
of firms 
 
Number 
of group 
affiliated 
firms 
 
(Median size 
of group 
affiliated 
firms)/ 
(Median size 
of 
unaffiliated 
firms) 
 
Median 
ROA of 
affiliated 
firms 
(percent) 
 
Median 
ROA of 
unaffiliated 
firms 
(percent) 
 
Median 
standard 
deviation 
of ROA, 
group 
affiliated 
firms 
(percent) 
 
Median 
standard 
deviation 
of ROA, 
unaffiliated 
firms 
(percent) 
 
Argentina 
 
1990–97 
 
25 
 
11 
 
5.5 
 
3.9 
 
7.8∗∗ 
 
3.7 
 
4.9∗∗ 
Brazil 1990–97 108 51 2.5 3.3 1.8∗∗ 4.1 5.1 
Chile 1989–96 225 50 18.7 5.9 2.2∗ 4.4 4.1. 
India 1990–97 5446 1821 4.4 11.7 9.6∗ 4.6 4.4∗ 
Indonesia 1993–95 236 153 2.8 7.3 7.8 1.9 2.5∗ 
Israel 1993–95 183 43 5.0 6.3 3.9∗ 2.1 2.6 
South Korea 1991–95 427 218 3.9 4.8 5.1 1.9 2.6∗ 
Mexico 1988–97 55 19 2.3 8.2 6.1 3.1 2.6 
Philippines 1992–97 148 37 3.4 7.3 4.0 2.5 2.9 
Taiwan 1990–97 178 79 2.0 5.1 6.2 1.7 2.3∗∗ 
Thailand 1992–97 415 258 2.3 2.9 4.4∗ 4.3 4.9∗∗ 
Turkey 1988–97 40 21 1.0 24.6 26.3 6.2 9.1 
Prewar Japan 1932–43 58 17 6.8 5.5 6.4 4.4 7.1 
Notes: The table shows summary statistics on group risk and operating performance for twelve emerging markets as 
well as for prewar Japan. Firm numbers, as well as statistics on firm size (total assets) and median return on assets 
(ROA), are all based on the year for which we have maximal coverage for the country in question. In pre- war 
Japan, group affiliation refers to affiliation in the largest three zaibatsu only. Significance levels for the com- 
parisons of medians are based on Wilcoxon signed-rank tests. Firms with profit rates above 100 percent or below 
–100 percent are excluded from the analysis. and denote a difference between group-affiliated and other firms 
that is significant at the 5 percent and 10 percent levels, respectively. See Khanna and Yafeh (2005) for data sources 
and for more information on the sample and variable definitions. 
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erably in form: some are extremely diversi- 
fied  whereas  others  are  more  focused.  In 
some groups there is considerable vertical 
integration and intragroup trade; in others, 
less. Some groups are deeply involved in 
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the extent of group diversification, vertical 
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other firms that is significant at the 5 percent and 10 percent levels, respectively. See Khanna and Yafeh (2005)
for data sources and for more information on the sample and variable definitions.
within economics, including industrial rganization, corporate financ , de-
velopment and growth, and even open-economy macro to the extent that it
deals with financial crises.
In addition, the comparative study of business groups in emerging mar-
kets may shed new light on some economic phenomena in developed econo-
mies. For exa ple, although many business groups are highly diversi-
fied, unlike American conglomerates each group firm is an independent en-
tity, and the equity stake of outside investors can vary across group firms.
Why are diversified entities in the United States organized as conglomer-
ates rather than business groups? Is the answer related to economic and
financial development? Or is it perhaps due to differences in the rule of law,
social structure, or political economy? Is it due to unique historical devel-
opments in the United States? The study of business groups in emerging
markets could potentially offer some answers.
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The present paper attempts to make three contributions to the literature
on business groups. The first is motivated by the view that the diversity of
business groups around the world is due to the diversity of the underlying
conditions leading to their formation. This approach is at the basis of a novel
taxonomy of business groups along three dimensions:
(1) Group structure: the extent of horizontal diversification; the extent of
vertical integration; and the extent of involvement in the financial sector.
(2) Group ownership and control: the extent to which the group is pyra-
midal in structure; the extent to which it is family controlled.
(3) Group interaction with society: the nature of the interaction between
business groups and the state; the extent of monopoly power wielded by
groups.
This taxonomy is used to derive six testable hypotheses about the rea-
sons for the formation of business groups, their prevalence in different eco-
nomic environments, and the welfare implications associated with their pres-
ence. In general, the framework in which economic agents form business
groups in response to the economic and institutional environment within
which they operate is in the spirit of work by Aoki (2001) or Greif (2006),
who emphasize that institutions should be analyzed within a particular eco-
nomic context. Because groups arise for different reasons and in different
environments, we argue that their impact on social welfare is ambiguous,
even though much of the existing literature suggests that they are uniformly
welfare-reducing: groups may sometimes play a positive role by making up
for underdeveloped economic institutions, but they can also be detrimental
to social welfare because of rent seeking or monopoly power. There is there-
fore no clear verdict on the extent to which groups should be viewed as
“paragons” or “parasites,” and the answer is likely to vary across countries,
groups, and possibly time periods.
The second contribution of the present study is the presentation of new
stylized data and evidence on several facets of business groups which go
beyond the existing literature. In particular, we present comparable data on
the origins and emergence of business groups around the world. This is key
because group membership should generally be viewed as endogenous and
because most of the empirical literature on business groups is plagued by
lack of data on group origin. Another example of novel data in this paper is
preliminary evidence supporting the view that groups do not only respond
to their environment but also shape and influence it. Although econometric
evidence on this point is almost entirely absent, historical evidence in sev-
eral countries is supportive of this view. This dynamic effect of groups on
their economic environment is sometimes socially welfare-enhancing, and
sometimes not.
The third contribution of the present study is to question some of the
conventional wisdom in the literature. For example, groups, we argue,
are not purely rent-seeking organizations as some of the literature has por-
Copyright c© 2015 University of Perugia Electronic Press. All rights reserved 4
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Table 2 - Group Heterogeneity Around the World
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TABLE 2 
GROUP  HETEROGENEITY AROUND  THE  WORLD 
 
 
Country 
 
Group 
diversification 
 
Group vertical 
integration 
 
Group assets in 
financial firms 
Brazil 1.4 0.04 N/A 
Chile 5.1 0.06 0.24 
India 4.2 0.04 0.05 
Indonesia 2.1 0.04 0.45 
South Korea 1.7 0.04 N/A 
Mexico 2.7 0.02 0.05 
Philippines 3.1 0.08 0.60 
Taiwan 1.6 0.02 0.01 
Thailand 3.5 0.04 0.35 
Notes: Group diversification is measured as the number of two-digit industries in which the group oper- ates. 
Group vertical integration is the average input–output coefficient across all pairs of firms within the group 
(see footnote 1), and involvement in financial services is measured as the fraction of all group assets in group 
financial firms. See Khanna and Yafeh (2005) for data sources and for more information on the sample and 
variable definitions. 
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This dynamic effect of groups on their eco- 
nomic environment is sometimes socially 
welfare-enhancing, and sometimes not. 
The third contribution of the present study is 
to question some of the conventional wis- 
dom in the literature. For example, groups, we 
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Notes: Group diversification is measured as the number of two-digit industries in which the group operat s. Group
vertical integratio is the averag input-output coefficient across all pair of firms within the group (see footnote
1), and involv ment in financial services is mea ured as the fraction of all group assets in group financial firms.
See Khanna and Yafeh (2005) for data sources and for more information on the sample and variable definitions.
trayed them. Nor should grou s be equated with pyramids, nd pyramids
are not always the, or even a, way of disenfranchising minority sharehold-
ers.
The literature on business groups in economics and finance has focused
primarily on two themes. The first regards business groups as diversified
entities, and studies the relations between this feature and various questions
in indust ial organizatio and corporate finance. The econd, more recent,
research th me on business groups follows Shleifer and Vishny’s (1997) sur-
vey on corporate governance and subsequent work by La Porta et al. (1997,
1998). Studies in this line of research regard business groups, especially their
pyramidal forms, as a favorite setting for the study of conflicts of interests
between controlling and minority shareholders; the latter’s expropriation
is often ref rred to as “tunneling.”2 Beside diversification and unneling, a
small number of economic studies emphasize rent seeking and the some-
times close relations between business groups and the governments of the
countries in which they operate. An even smaller number of studies attempt
to relate groups to monopoly power and imperfect competition.
Outsid economics and finance, groups hav tt acted a lot of academic
int rest i soci logy, where they are viewed as networks of social, not only
economic, significance (e.g., Gerlach 1992; Granovetter 2005; Hamilton 1997;
Keister 2004; Orru` et al., 1997). Studies of business groups are also common
in business history, where the unit of analysis is typically the history of one
2 The term ’tunneling’ has become popular following Johnson et al. (2000) who trace its
origins to the expropriation of minority shareholders in the Czech Republic.
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group (e.g., Roberts 1973 on the house of Mitsui; Steers 1999 on the Hyundai
group, and many more) or on groups in a single country (e.g., Amsden
1989’s study of South Korea and its chaebol groups or Piramal 1998’s study
of Indian business houses). Although extensive, the literature on business
groups leaves many interesting questions unanswered.
The present papers builds on our own earlier surveys of business groups
- a short overview by Khanna (2000) on emerging markets and by Yafeh
(2003) on Japan. There are also two complementary, concurrent surveys that
readers should consult - Granovetter (2005) reviews the economic sociology
literature, and Morck et al. (2005) discuss pyramidal groups and corporate
governance.
The rest of the paper is organized around the taxonomy of business
groups around the world: section 2 focuses on dimensions related to the
structure of business groups; in section 3 we examine dimensions related
to ownership and control; section 4 focuses on two dimensions of the inter-
action between business groups and society; and the con- cluding section,
section 5, delineates a future research agenda. All sections contain one or
more hypotheses derived from the taxonomy of business groups, which are
followed by subsections presenting the existing evidence.
2 Structure and Form of Business Groups
2.1 Structure of Business Groups: Diversification
Prevailing managerial theories advocate that companies should discover
their source of competitive advantage and remain true to it. This “conven-
tional wisdom” is not based on unambiguous theoretical predictions: cor-
porate diversification can be beneficial to shareholders if a firm has certain
resources that can be profitably deployed outside the industry in which it
operates, such as entrepreneurial skills, technology, etc. In addition, when
equity markets function poorly, it may be possible to lower risk through
diversification across industries. In contrast with these positive arguments
for diversification, there are also theoretical foundations for the view that di-
versification can be harmful if it is driven by managerial objectives such as
“empire building” or risk aversion, or if it leads to agency problems among
division managers (e.g., Rajan et al., 2000; Scharfstein and Stein 2000). Em-
pirically, the common view in the United States, that diversification “de-
stroys shareholder value,” has been supported by evidence on the relative
performance of firms focused on a small number of industries in compar-
ison with diversified firms—which suggests that, in the United States, the
costs associated with diversification typically exceed the benefits.3
3 See surveys by Montgomery (1994) and Martin and Sayrak (2003). The association of
diversification with a loss of firm value in modern U.S. data is sometimes called the ’di-
Copyright c© 2015 University of Perugia Electronic Press. All rights reserved 6
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The ubiquity of diversified (and often fairly successful) business groups
in many countries outside the United States is therefore in sharp contrast
with the prevailing conventional wisdom. Why then is diversification in
the form of business groups so common in emerging markets? Leaving
aside (for now) the question why the typical institutional mechanism for
diversification is conglomerates in the United States and business groups in
emerging markets, the following hypothesis offers one possible explanation:
Hypothesis 1: Diversified business groups should be more common in econo-
mies with less developed market institutions.
Hypothesis 1 is based on the conjecture that corporate focus need not
necessarily be a good strategy in environments less economically developed
than the United States, where the benefits of diversification may exceed the
costs. The main reason is that some of the institutions that make diversi-
fication unnecessary or even harmful in developed economies do not exist
or are underdeveloped in poorer countries. Capital markets are incomplete
and may be plagued with informational and other problems, making risk
reduction through diversification and the use of internal capital markets
relatively efficient in comparison with poorly regulated external markets.
Labor markets may also lack institutions training skilled labor and manage-
ment, making diversified business groups, where trained personnel can be
used for a variety of tasks across many group firms, a possible substitute for
these institutions.4
2.1.1 Evidence on Groups and the Diversification Discount in Emerging
Markets
A starting point in the discussion of the validity of Hypothesis 1 is the
question whether or not a diversification discount exists in emerging mar-
kets. The general answer seems to be that the diversification discount tends
to be lower in environments where markets, including, but not limited to,
financial markets, are less developed, in line with Hypothesis 1. In some
cases, diversified entities are even traded at a premium rather than a dis-
count. For example, Fauver et al. (2003), who, following U.S. studies, rely on
stock market data, find that the diversification discount is a feature of high
income countries, with developed (financial) markets and institutions. By
versification discount’. This discount is interpreted as evidence of a causal link (corporate
diversification is the cause of the reduction in shareholder wealth) in studies such as Ami-
hud and Lev (1981); Morck et al. (1990); Lang and Stulz (1994); Berger and Ofek (1995);
and Comment and Jarrell (1995). Several more recent studies have cast some doubt on
the causal interpretation of the diversification discount, focusing on the endogeneity of
the decision to diversify and on measurement problems of both performance and diver-
sification; see, for example, Campa and Kedia (2002); Chevalier (2004); Villalonga (2004a)
and (2004b); and Whited (2001).
4 For earlier formulations of this hypothesis, see Khanna and Palepu (1999a, 2000b, and
2000c). An even earlier descriptive reasoning is due to Leff (1976, 1978).
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contrast, in low-income countries, there is no market discount - and some-
times there is even a premium - for corporate diversification. Qualitatively
similar results are reported by Claessens et al. (2003), who use both stock
market and accounting variables to measure the value of diversification.
They find a diversification premium in the relatively poor countries in East
Asia (Indonesia, the Philippines, or Thailand) and a diversification discount
in the richer countries in the region (e.g., Hong Kong or Taiwan). Although
both Fauver et al. (2003) and Claessens et al. (2003) refer to multisegment
firms in general, not specifically to corporate groups, there is some time se-
ries evidence on business groups indicating that the relative advantage of
groups declines as market institutions develop. For example, Khanna and
Palepu (2000c) document the declining (stock market and accounting prof-
itability based) group premium over a decade associated with economic re-
form and development of market institutions in Chile. Lee et al. (2001)
observe that companies affiliated with the South Korean business groups,
the chaebol, used to be traded at a premium until the early 1990s - but the
premium turned into a discount starting around 1994 (see also Ferris et al.,
2003). A number of other studies discussed below concur and claim that in
recent years the relative performance of group affiliated companies in South
Korea has not been very good, although this aggregate statistic masks con-
siderable variation between some groups which have done very well (e.g.,
Samsung) and some group that have done very poorly (e.g., Daewoo).
Table 1, where unconditional risk and returns characteristics of diversi-
fied business groups around the world are displayed, suggests a more nu-
anced picture, which casts some doubt on the view that the benefits of diver-
sification are higher in institutionally underdeveloped emerging markets.
Although firms within certain diversified groups, for example, in Brazil, Is-
rael, and the Philippines, outperform their non-group affiliated peers, the
relative performance of firms affiliated with diversified groups cannot be
easily related to economic development, to the oftencited differences in le-
gal origins across countries (La Porta et al. 1997, 1998) or to measures of fi-
nancial development. Indeed, country-specific institutional characteristics,
especially those associated with financial markets,5 suggest that it is hard to
find common institutional features among the countries where group firms
seem to do relatively well: contract enforcement is relatively efficient in Is-
rael and poor in the Philippines (Brazil is in between). Similarly, among the
countries where group firms are characterized by low risk and low return,
South Korea ranks relatively high in contract enforcement and Argentina
relatively low.6 We conclude that diversified business groups are some-
5 See, for example, the World Bank, Doing Business data set,
http://rru.worldbank.org/DoingBusiness, featuring information on the duration
and cost of bankruptcy procedures as well as on the efficiency of contract enforcement.
6 Although Table 1 displays unconditional statistics, multivariate regressions generate
a similarly ambiguous picture; see Khanna and Rivkin (2001) and Khanna and Yafeh
(2005).
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times associated with good performance of affiliated firms, but the relation
between the costs and benefits of diversification on the one hand, and eco-
nomic and institutional development on the other, is probably more com-
plex than what Hypothesis 1 suggests. The ambiguity of the results implies
that in emerging markets too, there are certainly cases of diversified groups
which destroy shareholder value in line with the evidence on the United
States.7
Ignoring the ambiguity of the evidence in Table 1, leaving aside sample
selection issues,8 and assuming that a causal interpretation can be assigned
to the correlation between diversification and performance, the particular
reason(s) why diversification may be optimal in (at least some) environ-
ments with relatively underdeveloped institutions is not clear. We examine
several possible explanations.
2.1.2 Evidence on Groups, Diversification and Internal Capital Markets
Historical observations on the U.S. economy suggest that capital markets
may be the underdeveloped institution driving the empirical correlation
between diversification and shareholder value in different environments.
There is evidence suggesting that the “diversification discount” may have
been smaller in the United States in earlier periods when financial markets
(more than other institutions?) were less developed.9 This might suggest
that, in such an environment, raising capital in an internal capital market
of a diversified entity might have been more efficient than communicating
with external potential providers of capital, primarily because of informa-
tion problems.
But are internal capital markets the main reason why diversified busi-
ness groups are formed in underdeveloped countries? And if so, are infor-
mation problems in financial markets the crucial factor? Direct evidence on
7 An important distinction between the literature on emerging market groups and the lit-
erature on conglomerate diversification in the United States is that U.S.-based studies
typically look at the relation between the diversity of an entire conglomerate and its per-
formance, whereas in the literature on emerging markets the unit of analysis is typically
an individual group firm, which resembles a aˆline of businessaˆ activity in U.S. data (see
Khanna and Palepu 2000b).
8 Comparisons of group versus nongroup firms are plagued with selection issues, the most
obvious one being the assumption that group affiliation is exogenous, or at least histori-
cally predetermined. Another selection problem is related to the choice of groups to list
some but not all companies. This makes comparisons based on listed firms potentially
biased.
9 De Long (1991), for example, argues that firms that were part of the J. P. Morgan group
(had Morgan men on their boards) were traded at a premium in the early decades of the
twentieth century (although causality is hard to infer from this). Moving to the 1960s,
Matsusaka (1993) and Hubbard and Palia (1999) report that acquisitions of companies in
industries unrelated to the bidderaˆs core industry were not penalized by U.S. financial
markets at that time. Furthermore, Hubbard and Palia (1999) emphasize that the returns
to bidders tended to be especially high when the acquired target firms were financially
constrained.
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these questions is scarce. A series of studies on business groups in South
Korea is indirectly supportive of the underdeveloped financial markets ver-
sion of Hypothesis 1: Chang and Choi (1988), one of the earliest studies
of diversified groups in South Korea, find that group-affiliated firms were
more profitable than other South Korean companies in the 1980s, but several
more recent studies on the South Korean chaebol report relatively poor per-
formance of group affiliated companies in the 1990s (although some groups
have continued to do very well). One interpretation of this pattern is that,
as the South Korean economy became more mature and financial markets
more liberalized in the 1990s, the advantage of business groups in access-
ing capital was gradually eroded. Nevertheless, other explanations for this
pattern, not related to underdeveloped institutions (capital or other) are cer-
tainly possible: For example, South Korea faced a severe crisis in 1997-98,
for which some observers blamed business groups. In the aftermath of the
crisis, the government’s approach toward the big business groups under-
went deep changes, and this may have affected the ability of group-affiliated
firms to generate profits. In addition, the fact that the founding generation
of owners-managers had to turn over the keys to the second generation,
typically within the family, may also have had adverse effects. It is very
difficult to disentangle the impact of these different forces; the focus on one
economic force or another in the existing literature seems to be somewhat
arbitrary.10
More evidence on the conjecture that the performance of diversified busi-
ness groups is related to internal capital markets (and imperfections in ex-
ternal capital markets) can be found in studies estimating investment-cash
flow sensitivities for group and non-group firms (in the spirit of Fazzari et
al., 1988; Hoshi et al., 1991; and Shin and Stulz 1998). Shin and Park (1999)
apply this methodology to South Korean business groups, and Perotti and
Gelfer (2001) to Russian financial–industrial groups (FIG), and find that in-
dividual group firms are not very sensitive to their own cash flows when
10 Chang and Choi (1988) interpret their finding of superior performance of group firms
as evidence that the group structure enhances efficiency through effective management
and lower transaction costs, not necessarily in financial markets. They do not test this hy-
pothesis against other possible explanations that may have made the biggest and most
diversified South Korean groups relatively profitable in the 1980s. Among the studies
documenting the poor performance of members of South Koreaaˆs business groups in
the 1990s, Campbell and Keys (2002) report lower profits (but higher sales growth) for
group-affiliated firms and relate this finding to inadequate corporate governance: exec-
utive turnover, they argue, is not closely related to performance. Ferris et al. (2003),
who use stock market data, find that chaebol-affiliated firms currently trade at a dis-
count and suggest that this may be due to low profits, over-investment, or inefficient
cross-subsidization within the groups. Similar arguments on over-investment, typically
financed by (often state-subsidized) debt, are made by Lee and Lee (2002) and by Choi
and Cowing (1999). Other studies, such as Lee et al. (2000), attribute the poor perfor-
mance of chaebol firms to low productive efficiency, presumably also due to overexpan-
sion.
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making investment decisions; they are, however, sensitive to the cash flows
of the rest of the group suggesting the existence of an internal capital market
which transfers resources across firms. The welfare implications of this in-
ternal capital market are, however, ambiguous: on the positive side, a group
can include a main bank (or a cash cow) and provide funding to affiliated
firms too small or opaque to have easy access to outside financial markets.
This should be particularly valuable when the protection of creditors and
accounting standards are weak, so that arms length lending will be limited.
The very limited evidence in the literature is insufficient to evaluate this con-
jecture: Shin and Park (1999) argue that internal capital markets within the
South Korean chaebol are actually inefficient (supporting too much invest-
ment by group firms with weak investment opportunities), whereas Perotti
and Gelfer (2001) do not take a stand on the efficiency of such transfers in
Russia. Overall, these studies provide mixed evidence on the validity of
Hypothesis 1.11
Another approach to evaluate whether diversified groups emerge in re-
sponse to capital market imperfections is that of Khanna and Yafeh (2005),
who test the extent to which diversified groups make up for underdevel-
oped financial markets by providing mutual insurance or risk sharing among
group firms. They find that risk sharing is a characteristic of business groups
only in a small number of emerging markets, most notably South Korea, and
to a lesser extent Thailand and Taiwan. They do not find a clear relation be-
tween the extent of group diversification and the prevalence of within group
risk sharing, and neither do they find any evidence that risk sharing is more
common where external financial markets are less developed. This study
is therefore inconsistent with Hypothesis 1 with respect to the provision of
insurance in environments where the availability of state-contingent claims
is very limited.12
2.1.3 Evidence on Group Diversification for Reasons Unrelated to Capi-
tal Markets
There is some evidence supporting a version of Hypothesis 1 in which
diversification is beneficial in emerging markets for reasons unrelated to
financial markets. Imperfections in labor markets (both for skilled employ-
ees and for executives), limited enforcement of contracts, inadequate rule
of law and other institutional deficiencies may give rise to business groups
that generate these public goods for the benefit of group members. In line
11 See also Samphantharak (2003) who uses a different methodology to discuss internal
capital markets in Thai business groups.
12 Khanna and Yafeh (2005) document also some degree of risk sharing in India through
within-group transfers. For more on risk sharing in Indian business groups, see Gopalan
et al. (forthcoming) who discuss group assistance to firms in distress, and Marisetty and
Subrahmanyam (2006) who discuss the survival probability of group firms after going
public.
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with this argument, Hyundai, for example, established a training center for
technical personnel to be used by the entire group, as well as an applied
research institute.13
Diversified groups may be efficient if they make up for missing insti-
tutions related to the process of entrepreneurship: new ventures initiated
by business groups rely not only on capital infusion from the group, but
often also on the group brand name and implicitly on its reputation, pro-
viding a guarantee that is scarce in emerging markets (Maurer and Sharma
2001). There is also an internal (within-group) market for talent. In this
sense, some business groups are perhaps closer to private equity firms than
to conglomerates. Jones (2000) makes this point in relation to British trad-
ing houses in the early twentieth century: one of the primary functions of
these early groups (which, like many venture capital funds today, were of-
ten organized as partnerships) was “identifying opportunities and placing
potential British investors in touch with them” (pp. 50–51). It may be possi-
ble to argue that, in India today, Tata Industries comes close to this view of a
business group as a quasi-venture capitalist, albeit with longer investment
horizons than typical American private equity funds (Khanna and Palepu
2005). Another Indian group, Birla, helped found and finance new firms,
which were later spun-off using the entrepreneurial talent of its employees.
The process of “spawning” new companies by established business groups
may potentially be important in emerging markets where it is probably dif-
ficult to start de novo.14
Khanna and Palepu (1999a) use survey data to in order to try and iden-
tify sources of benefits from affiliation with a diversified group. Their anal-
ysis, which is based on intragroup confidential information, indicates that
in both Chile and India group activity increased during periods following
extensive liberalization and pro-market reforms, and in a way which appar-
ently enhanced profitability. Their survey evidence suggests that this was
primarily due to group advantages in product and labor (rather than capi-
tal) markets.
At present, the precise identification of the sources of group advantage
remains an empirical challenge. Studies such as Khanna and Palepu (2000b)
and (2000c), who find that in India and in Chile the relation between diver-
sification and profitability among business groups is nonlinear (beyond a
certain level diversification is associated with higher profits), can be inter-
preted in many ways. One way forward is perhaps to exploit variations in
the nature of market imperfections across different countries. This is diffi-
13 See also Khanna and Palepu (1997) on the Tata group in India, and Chang (2003a) on
human resource management in South Korean business groups. Greif and Kandel (1995)
discuss the underdevelopment of contract enforcement institutions in Russia in the early
1990s, which may have precipitated the emergence of financial-industrial groups.
14 See Gompers et al. (2005) for a discussion of entrepreneurial spawning in the United
States. In this context, diversification may be the result of within-group entrepreneurial
activities rather than their cause.
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cult if types of market imperfections are positively correlated (e.g., where
capital markets are underdeveloped, labor markets may also be so), but
some interesting examples can nevertheless be found. For example, diversi-
fication in Chile, where financial markets are fairly developed and the rule
of law is relatively good, is unlikely to be due to the same mix of reasons
that led to the emergence of diversified groups in Suharto’s Indonesia. An-
other related possibility is to try and disentangle various reasons for the
existence of diversified groups by looking at changes in their activities and
scope in response to shocks (Ghemawat and Khanna 1998). For example, a
business group whose primary function is to form an internal capital market
is likely to shrink or disappear in response to financial market development,
whereas other groups would not. Not much research has been carried out
along these lines.15
Despite the ambiguity of the results in this section, our impression is
that there is some tentative evidence suggesting that, at least under some
circumstances, groups can make up for underdeveloped institutions in both
capital and labor markets (Khanna and Palepu 1997; Khanna 2000). Al-
though it is difficult to draw firm conclusions from this, one possible impli-
cation might be that the profit maximizing level of diversification (and per-
haps also the level of diversification which maximizes social welfare) may
be higher for companies (or groups) operating in emerging markets than
it is for American firms. It is not clear, however, why the business group
form (rather than a fully owned conglomerate) is the most popular way to
attain this level of diversification in many less developed economies. One
possibility is that, from the point of view of controlling shareholders, the
group structure is preferable, and only a unique historical event pre- vents
the existence of business groups in the United States as well - diversified
American groups were common through the mid-1930s until tax policies
introduced by President Roosevelt induced either the integration of groups
into conglomerates or the spin off of controlled subsidiaries (Morck 2005;
we return to this historical episode below). A possible rationale for the su-
periority and predominance of the group form in emerging markets is that
the group structure insulates the controlling shareholder from institutional
investor pressure and takeovers, and bestows undisputed control and eco-
nomic influence with limited capital investment. The group form may be
preferred also because of legal considerations, especially in relation to cor-
porate liability and the ability of the controlling shareholder to choose not to
bailout ailing group firms (Nicodano 2003). By contrast, the conglomerate
form may be more appropriate than a business group for the purpose of tax
reducing income smoothing across divisions.
15 Chung and Mahmood (2006), for example, document a trend of increasing diversification
over the last three decades in Taiwanese business groups, which coincided with a period
of deregulation. They do not provide a full explanation for this trend, and suggest that
tax considerations may be involved.
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2.2 Structure of Business Groups: The Extent of Vertical Inte-
gration
Limited contract enforcement, weak rule of law, corruption, and an in-
efficient judicial system should all lead to high transaction costs between
unrelated parties. Under such circumstances, intragroup trade, within the
context of long-run relationships supported by family and other social ties,
may be relatively cheap and efficient. This argument is summarized in the
following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: The presence of business groups, the extent of their vertical in-
tegration, and the volume of intragroup trade, should all be higher in environments
with underdeveloped legal and judicial institutions, where contracting is costly.
2.2.1 2.2.1 Evidence on Groups, Vertical Integration, and Contracting Costs
Surprisingly, we are not aware of any direct evidence testing this predic-
tion - which is similar to the Coase-Williamson arguments on the bound-
aries of the firm - in the context of business group structure.16 Data on the
volume of intragroup trade are not readily available, and the rudimentary
data on vertical integration in Table 2 are ambiguous (probably in part due
to the dubious quality of the available data). On the one hand, vertical in-
tegration among groups in the Philippines is high, in line with the poor
institutional infrastructure in that country. But the extent of vertical inte-
gration in relatively uncorrupt Chile is higher than in Indonesia, suggest-
ing that there may be other explanations besides contracting costs which
may account for this variation. One possibility is that vertical integration
serves primarily as a means to obtain monopoly power or alleviate the dou-
ble monopoly problem, rather than as a tool to overcome contracting diffi-
culties (although the existence of contracting difficulties and opportunities
to exercise monopoly power may be correlated). This view is corroborated
by the CEO of the Indonesian group Astra International who described in a
private interview the motivation for the vertical integration strategy of his
group as driven by the pursuit of monopoly power rather than by the in-
adequacy of contracting institutions. The food production within the Thai
CP Group has been considerably vertically integrated, but again, the stated
purpose was not contracting difficulties. In addition, there seems to be con-
siderable variation in the extent of vertical integration across groups within
16 Acemoglu et al. (2005), who use firm (not group) level data, argue that, controlling for
financial development and industrial structure, there is no relation between contracting
costs and a vertical integration index across countries. A recent working paper by Fan et
al. (2006) reports preliminary evidence of more vertical integration in Chinese provinces
with weak protection of property rights in comparison with other provinces. There is no
distinction in this study between vertical integration within a single firm and integration
within a business group.
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the same country, suggesting that group and industry-specific factors play a
role which is sometimes more important than country-specific institutional
factors.17 The more systematic evidence on vertical integration provided
by Chang (2003a) is consistent with this view: he constructs group and
industry-specific measures of vertical integration for South Korea and finds
it to be considerable in the largest groups and in certain industries (e.g., au-
tomobiles). He argues that vertical integration may have been an efficient
strategy in the past (in line with Hypothesis 2), but it involves considerable
difficulties today.18
2.3 Structure of Business Groups: Involvement in the Finan-
cial Sector
Group involvement in banking, insurance and other aspects of the fi-
nancial system may be related to transaction costs considerations similar to
those driving vertical integration. A variation of Hypothesis 2 may apply to
this context as well: contracting costs, institutional quality, and financial de-
velopment should explain business group involvement in financial services,
in addition to country-specific government regulations.
2.3.1 Evidence on Group Involvement in Financial Services
Historically, British multinational business groups in the early twenti-
eth century were heavily involved in financial services over- seas, in line
with Hypothesis 2 on high financial contracting costs in these environments
(Jones 2000). Chilean business groups were also involved in finance prior
to the liberalization and financial development of the 1980s. Large Indone-
sian groups typically use a group-specific financial institution, a feature that
became more pronounced when their capital needs increased: Astra Inter-
national, for example, was in process of expanding its automobile assembly
lines in 1970s when it started acquiring banks and expanding into other fi-
nancial services. In Turkey, almost all banks are group-affiliated (Yurtoglu
2000). The contemporary cross sectional evidence on group involvement in
financial services and financial development provided in Table 2 suggests,
however, that there is considerable variation in group involvement in finan-
cial services even among countries where financial contracting is presum-
ably costly, perhaps because of regulatory differences.
Beyond the prevalence of group involvement in the financial sector, the
17 For example, the Turkish group Eczacibasi is fully vertically integrated in its core phar-
maceutical business, but other Turkish groups exhibit much less vertical integration.
18 Feenstra et al. (2003) and Feenstra and Hamilton (2006) also provide evidence showing
that South Korean business groups, especially the very large ones, are more vertically
integrated (and more horizontally diversified) than Taiwanese groups. They propose a
model with multiple competitive outcomes, rather than differences in transaction costs,
to explain these differences.
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fragmentary existing evidence on the performance of group-affiliated finan-
cial institutions is, to some extent, consistent with the view that group in-
volvement in this sector makes up for its underdevelopment. Maurer (1999)
and Maurer and Haber (2006) emphasize the positive roles of related lend-
ing within Mexican business groups in the period 1888–1913, when con-
tracting institutions were in their infancy.19 By contrast, La Porta et al.
(2003) document the negative sides of “related lending” in contemporary
Mexican groups. In the early 1980s, Chilean groups were implicated in a
financial crisis and the associated failure of the first wave of privatization
in that country, allegedly because of related lending.20 A conceptual diffi-
culty in the discussion of this issue is the endogeneity of financial under-
development, which may actually be due to group influence; this makes
the relation between business group involvement in financial services and
the development of these services complex. These issues are related to the
recent literature on the political economy of finance, where investor protec-
tion and financial system institutions are modeled as endogenous outcomes
of political processes (see Morck et al., 2005).
3 Ownership and Control of Business Groups
3.1 Pyramidal versus Other Groups
We now turn to variation in ownership and control characteristics in
business groups around the world. Perhaps the most important distinction
in this category is between pyramidal and other organizational structures.
This is because of the strong link in the literature, dating back to Berle and
Means (1932, book 1, chapter 5), between pyramids and the expropriation
of minority shareholders: in pyramidal groups there is typically a large di-
vergence between the large shareholder’s “control rights” (which are often
very high) and “cash flow rights” which are typically much smaller (e.g.,
Arye Bebchuk et al. 2000; Bianchi et al. 2001). This, in combination with the
inadequacy of some of the regulatory institutions in many emerging mar-
kets, generates an envi- ronment in which “tunneling” (the expropriation of
minority shareholders) can become a common feature of the economy:
Hypothesis 3: (a) Pyramidal groups should be particularly common in coun-
tries with poor investor protection and inadequate rule of law. (b) These countries
should have under-developed equity markets because investors will demand a dis-
count when buying shares of companies affiliated with a pyramidal group.21
19 See also Lamoreaux (1994) for a positive view of related lending by New England Banks
in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.
20 See also Chang (2003a), chapter 5, on related lending in South Korea, and Cull et al.
(2006) for a discussion of conditions under which related lending has positive effects.
21 Hypothesis 3 focuses on equity finance; this logic seems somewhat less applicable to debt
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3.1.1 Evidence on Pyramids, Tunneling, and Financial Development
The literature on pyramidal groups and conflicts of interest between ma-
jority and minority shareholders is discussed in great detail in Morck et
al. (2005). Their reading of the evidence is consistent with Hypothesis 3:
family-controlled pyramidal business groups in countries where minority
shareholders are not well protected are associated with the expropriation of
small shareholders, and this adversely affects financial development.22 In
line with Hypothesis 3, tunneling has become the main focus of much of
the recent literature on business groups: Table 3, which summarizes many
of the existing studies on groups in South Korea, illustrates how the initial
research interest in groups as diversified entities has been nearly completely
replaced by studies of conflicts between majority and minority sharehold-
ers. In what follows we raise a number of concep- tual issues related to the
literature on pyramidal groups and tunneling.
First, how many of the business groups around the world are actually
vertically controlled pyramids and where are they located? Despite the cen-
trality of this question, the answer is less clear-cut than it should be. La Porta
et al. (1999), who do not focus specifically on business groups, find that
widely held firms are rare outside the United States and the United King-
dom. By contrast, concentrated family ownership, often exercised through
pyramids and other mechanisms that enable control in excess of cash flow
rights are quite common around the world. This view is supported by Barca
and Becht (2001)’s description of ownership and control of European firms
(see also Faccio and Lang 2002), and by the evidence in Claessens et al.
(2000) and Claessens et al. (2002) on the ownership and control of Asian
firms. But even within this general framework, there seems to be consid-
erable cross-sectional variation. Khanna and Thomas (2004) study business
groups in Chile, where, they argue, pyramidal equity ties characterize less
than half of all group firms. According to Barontini and Caprio (2005), un-
like Claessens et al. (2002)’s description of Asian firms, a wedge between
cash flow and control rights in family-dominated firms in Continental Eu-
rope is far more commonly associated with dual shares than with pyramidal
structures. By contrast, Chang (2003a) argues that in South Korea pyrami-
dal structures are common, Polsiri and Wiwattanakantang (2006) estimate
(without providing precise data) that about half of the business groups in
Thailand are pyramidal, and Yurtoglu (2000) discusses the prevalence of
pyramids in Turkey. Some pyramidal groups can also be found in other
countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia and Mexico. Part of the difficulty in
mapping pyramidal groups stems from the fact that business group struc-
tures are often more complex than textbook pyramids, making a dichoto-
mous classification of groups into pyramids and nonpyramids difficult. The
finance, which is discussed below.
22 See also Almeida and Wolfenzon (forthcoming) for a theoretical discussion of these issues
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Table 3 - Studies on Business Groups in South Korea
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TABLE 3 
STUDIES  ON BUSINESS  GROUPS  IN SOUTH  KOREA 
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Chang and Choi 
(1988) 
 
 
 
Shin and Park 
(1999) 
 
 
 
 
Choi and Cowing 
(1999) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chang and Hong 
(2000) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bae, Kang, and 
Kim (2002) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Campbell and 
Keys (2002) 
 
 
Chang and Hong 
(2002) 
Main Argument, Sample Size, 
Sample Period 
 
 
Business groups with multidivisional 
structure show superior economic 
performance because of reduced 
transaction costs. 63 group affiliated 
and 119 independent firms, 1975-84. 
Internal capital markets in the chae- 
bol alleviate financing constraints, 
but are associated with inefficient 
allocation of funds. 123 group affiliat- 
ed firms and 194 independent firms, 
1994-95. 
Group firms exhibited relatively low 
profit rates before 1989; firms affili- 
ated with the largest groups appear 
to have somewhat higher growth 
rates and lower variation in profit 
rates compared with unaffiliated 
firms. 91 group affiliated firms and 
161 independent firms, 1985-93. 
Group firms benefit from group 
membership through sharing intangi- 
ble and financial resources with other 
member firms. Various forms of 
internal business transactions, such as 
debt guarantees, equity investments 
and internal trade are extensively 
used for the purpose of cross-subsi- 
dization. 1,248 companies, associated 
with 317 business groups, 1996. 
When a chaebol-affiliated firm makes 
an acquisition its stock price typically 
falls. Minority shareholders of the 
acquiring firm lose, but controlling 
shareholders benefit because the 
acquisition enhances the value of 
other firms in the group. Consistent 
with tunneling. 107 mergers, 87 
firms, 1981–97. 
Corporate governance problems 
among the top chaebol may have 
exacerbated the recent financial cri- 
sis. 356 firms, 1993-99. 
Business groups play an important 
role in developing countries by cir- 
cumventing market inefficiencies; 
these effects tend to be smaller in 
large business groups, and to 
decrease over time. 1,666 companies 
affiliated with 368 business groups, 
Category 
 
 
Groups as diversified 
entities 
 
 
 
Groups as diversified 
entities 
 
 
 
 
Groups as diversified 
entities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Groups as diversified 
entities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Corporate 
governance/pyramids/ 
tunneling 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Corporate 
governance/pyramids 
tunneling 
 
Groups as diversified 
entities 
Listed 
Firms 
Only? 
Yes 
 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Listed or 
statutorily 
audited 
companies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Listed on 
the KSE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Listed on 
the KSE 
 
 
Listed or 
statutorily 
audited 
companies 
Groups as 
Pyramids? 
 
No reference 
 
 
 
 
No reference 
 
 
 
 
 
No reference 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No reference 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Assumed 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No reference 
 
 
 
No reference 
Information 
about 
Families? 
No specific 
information 
 
 
 
No specific 
information 
 
 
 
 
No specific 
information 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Reference to 
Samsung and 
Hyundai 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No specific 
information 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No specific 
information 
 
 
Samsung 
mentioned 
  1985-96.   
(continued) 
Samsung group, for example, involves both vertical pyramidal control and
horizontal cross shareholding, making the decision whether or not it should
be considered a pyramid difficult (Kang 1997).
Second, in much of the literature, the link between pyramidal groups
and the expropriation of minority shareholders is an unquestioned axiom.
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Table 3 - (continued)
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Study Main Argument, Sample Size, Category Listed Groups as Info. about 
 Sample Period  Firms 
Only? 
Pyramids? Families? 
Chang (2003b) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ferris, Kim, and 
Kitsabunnarat 
(2003) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Joh (2003) 
 
 
 
Kim and Lee 
(2003) 
 
Baek, Kang, and 
Park (2004) 
 
 
 
Lim and Kim 
(2005) 
Simultaneous nature of relationship 
between ownership structure and 
performance in a sample of group 
affiliated public firms. Performance 
determines ownership structure but 
not vice versa: controlling share- 
holders use insider information to 
increase their direct and indirect 
equity stakes in more profitable 
firms and transfer profits to other 
affiliates through intragroup trade. 
419 chaebol-affiliates, 1986-96 
Chaebol-affiliated firms suffer loss 
of value relative to nonaffiliated 
firms. This may be due to: (1) pur- 
suit of profit stability rather than 
profit maximization; (2) overinvest- 
ment in low performing industries; 
(3) cross-subsidization of weaker 
members of their group. 759 chae- 
bol firm-year observations and 
1,316 independent firm-year obser- 
vations, 1990-95. 
Tunneling by controlling sharehold- 
ers when their cash flow rights are 
low. 5,829 firms, 1993-1997. 
 
Performance during crisis is related 
to agency problems. 590 firms, May 
1997-August 1998. 
Change in firm value during crisis 
is a function of firm-level differ- 
ences in corporate governance 
measures. 644 firms, November 
1997-December 1998. 
Highly leveraged groups with a 
high proportion of nonmanufactur- 
ing business tend to have direct 
ownership. Larger groups with a 
high proportion of nonvoting shares 
tend to have pyramidal structure. 
Groups with focused business lines 
tend to have larger family stakes. 
669 firms, 1995. 
Corporate 
governance/pyramids/ 
tunneling 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Groups as diversified 
entities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Corporate 
governance/pyramids/ 
tunneling 
 
Corporate 
governance/pyramids/ 
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Corporate 
governance/pyramids/ 
tunneling 
 
 
Groups as diversified 
entities + corporate 
governance/pyramids/ 
tunneling 
Yes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Listed or 
otherwise 
“registered” 
Companies 
 
Listed on 
the KSE 
 
Listed on 
the KSE 
 
 
 
Listed and 
unlisted 
Significant 
reference to 
this issue 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No reference 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Reference to 
this issue 
 
 
Reference to 
this issue 
 
Reference in 
the model 
 
 
 
Reference to 
this issue 
Quite a bit of 
reference to 
the family 
issue 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Reference to 
this issue; no 
specific 
information 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No specific 
information 
 
 
General ref- 
erence 
 
Control by 
family mem- 
bers among 
other vars. 
 
Reference to 
this issue; no 
specific 
information 
Notes: This table summarizes many of the English language journal articles on the South Korean chaebol. The litera- ture 
exhibits a pronounced shift in recent years from a positive (or at least mixed) view of groups as diversified enti- ties to a 
clear impression that groups are undesirable. The table also illustrates some strong trends in the economics–finance 
profession, as reflected in the recent focus on tunneling and conflicts between controlling and minority shareholders. 
Features of corporate groups which were praised in some of the early studies when South Korea was doing well (e.g., 
centralized control) have been reinterpreted more recently as potential weaknesses, which are detrimental to small 
shareholders. Finally, the table demonstrates the tendency to focus on listed or quasi-listed (audited) firms (because of 
data constraints), the limited use of information on group structure and on familial and other possible intragroup 
contracts, and the absence of a dynamic perspective. 
Notes: is table su marizes many of the English l nguage journal articl s n the South Korean chaebol. The
literature exhibits a pronounced shift in recent years from a positive (or at least mixed) view of groups as diversified
entities to a clear impression that groups are undesirable. The table also illustrates some strong trends in the
economics-finance profession, as reflected in the recent focus on tunneling and conflicts between controlling and
minority shareholders. Features of corporate groups which were praised in some of the early studies when South
Korea was doing well (e.g., centralized control) have been reinterpreted more recently as potential weaknesses,
which are detrimental to small shareholders. Finally, the table demonstrates the tendency to focus on listed or
quasi-listed (audited) firms (because of data constraints), the limited use of information on group structure and on
familial and other possible intragroup contracts, and the absence of a dynamic perspective.
This is unwarranted: the empirical evidence on the prevalence and sever-
ity of profit tunneling from minority shareholders within pyramidal groups
is far from clear-cut, although there is certainly anecdotal evidence on in-
cidents of tunneling in Europe (Johnson et al., 2000), and more system-
atic evidence from pyramidal Indian business groups (Bertrand et al., 2002)
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and South Korean business groups (Bae et al., 2002; Joh 2003; Baek et al.,
2006). But even these convincing studies of tunneling raise a number of
unanswered questions. For example, Bertrand et al. (2002) find that Indian
firms located lower within pyramidal groups are less sensitive to industry-
specific shocks to their profitability than are firms located in upper levels.
They interpret this result as evidence that positive shocks to firms in lower
levels of the pyramid are siphoned off to firms in upper levels of the group
pyramid, an activity which serves the interests of controlling shareholders,
but not of minority shareholders holding an equity stake in the tunneled
firms only. This interpretation is plausible for positive shocks (additional
profits are taken away by the controlling shareholders), but it is less self-
evident why tunneling would make firms located in low levels of the group
pyramid less sensitive to negative shocks.
Bae et al. (2002) examine acquisitions of often ailing companies by other
group firms within the South Korean chaebol groups and find that within-
group takeovers rarely raise the value of the bidder, but do raise the value
of other group members. They also provide some examples (from the LG
group, for instance) showing how such takeovers benefited controlling share-
holders at the expense of minority shareholders. Very closely related method-
ologically is a study by Baek et al. (2006) whose focus is on private securities
offerings within South Korean groups, rather than on takeovers. They find
that some of these securities are offered to other group members at prices
that are very far off from their true values, and document negative stock
price responses to such deals. But the tunneling interpretation favored in
these studies is not the only possible one; some intragroup takeovers and
securities placements may also constitute efficient mutual insurance or risk
sharing, as Khanna and Yafeh (2005) document for South Korea. Further-
more, Buysschaert et al. (2004) report a positive price response to within-
group equity sales in a small sample of pyramidal Belgian groups, suggest-
ing that these transactions are not always interpreted as harmful to minority
shareholders.
Moving to historical evidence from the Japanese prewar zaibatsu groups,
Morck and Nakamura (2005) argue that the growth patterns of some of the
Japanese prewar zaibatsu reflected the importance attributed to private ben-
efits of control by some large shareholders. Franks et al. (2006) disagree
and do not find much evidence of tunneling in the major zaibatsu groups;
instead, they argue that small shareholders were happy to invest in their
shares in the stock market dominated financial system of prewar Japan.
Another proxy used in the literature to measure tunneling is control pre-
mia, which are generally higher in countries where minority shareholder
protection is poor (Nenova 2003; Dyck and Zingales 2004). Yet the rela-
tion between control premia, minority shareholder rights and pyramidal
business groups is less than straightforward. South Korea, for example, is
found to have a high control premium in both studies, yet in certain other
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countries where business groups are dominant (e.g., Indonesia) control pre-
mia are low. Furthermore, in some European countries (e.g., Austria or the
Czech Republic) the value of controlling blocks is much higher than in the
chaebol-dominated South Korean economy (see Dyck and Zingales 2004).
Beside the caveat that not all groups are pyramids and the fact that some
of the empirical results on tunneling are open to more than one interpreta-
tion, even where groups are pyramidal in structure, reputation and other
safeguards might preclude minority shareholder exploitation. Holmen and
Ho¨gfeldt (2005), for example, dispute the equation of pyramids and tun-
neling in present-day Sweden, where there is adequate investor protection.
Historically, tunneling did not seem to be a major concern for British in-
vestors in the early twentieth century, who were eager to invest money in
multi- national trading groups with certain pyramidal characteristics; affili-
ation with one of the family-controlled British merchant houses was appar-
ently viewed as a stamp of certification, rather than as a reason for fear of
expropriation (Jones 2000, chapter 6).23
More recent evidence in Cheung et al. (2006), who document tunneling
in Hong Kong (often through “connected transactions” between related par-
ties), suggests that tunneling is not especially common in pyramidal groups.
Bennedsen and Nielsen (2006) provide evidence that in Europe dual class
shares destroy more value than pyramids. In other words, not all pyramids
are associated with tunneling, and tunneling is not restricted to pyramidal
organizations.
Finally, much of the literature pays only scant attention to the partic-
ipation constraints of investors in these pyramidal schemes.24 Why, on a
routine basis, do investors continue to invest in situations where their in-
vestment is likely to be expropriated? It is, perhaps, possible to argue that
naı¨ve investors in emerging markets invest in business groups prone to tun-
neling because of inexperience or inadequate human capital; we find this
implausible. Another possibility is that the feasible alternatives available to
investors are extremely limited, although this claim probably did not apply
historically to British investors in merchant houses. An explanation that we
find more plausible is that group reputation for fair treatment of minority
shareholders is an important consideration (see Gomes 2000 for a related
theoretical model). This could be group reputation for risk sharing (or as-
sistance to poorly performing companies) which reduces the default risk of
group-affiliated companies, a feature which investors may find attractive
even if they know that they are exposed to a certain risk of expropriation by
controlling shareholders. A more formal mechanism is proposed by Faccio
et al. (2001) who find that some groups, especially in Europe, are known to
23 It is interesting to note that these pyramidal business groups did not operate within the
United Kingdom, only overseas. This may support the view that business groups make
up for underdeveloped institutions.
24 Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002) is a notable exception. See also Morck et al. (2000).
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pay higher dividends and thus compensate investors for the risk of expro-
priation. Finally, it is possible that at least some part of the alleged tunneling
may in fact represent returns to some core asset, with the investing public’s
participation constraints being satisfied. This asset can be a socially produc-
tive one, such as some core entrepreneurial ability, or a socially detrimental
lobbying capability (e.g., Faccio 2006). At present, the literature provides
very few answers to these questions.25
3.2 Family versus Nonfamily Groups
Another dimension related to ownership and control in the taxonomy of
business groups around the world has to do with role of family considera-
tions in the presence, evolution and performance of groups:
Hypothesis 4: (a) Family-controlled groups are likely to be more common in
countries with inadequate rule of law, where transactions with outsiders are costly.
(b) Family considerations influence the formation, structure and performance of
family- controlled groups; in some cases, groups may continue to exist for family-
related societal reasons, even when they no longer enhance economic efficiency.
3.2.1 Evidence on Groups and Families
Evidence on the relation between families, the prevalence of business
groups and economic institutions is provided by La Porta et al. (1999) who
document higher presence of family firms (not necessarily groups) in en-
vironments where contracting is difficult. Fogel (2006), using data on the
largest business groups and individual companies in over forty countries,
also suggests that family ownership is more common in economies with
poor institutions. One reading of these findings is that kinship and other so-
cial ties facilitate economic transactions (Granovetter 2005) and, more gen-
erally, that business groups are networks whose prevalence facilitate the
creation of “trust,” which makes up for incomplete contracts and imperfect
rule of law. Fogel (2006), by contrast, claims that family ownership and
control is the cause of economic and institutional underdevelopment.26
In addition to these two international comparisons, there are a number
of studies documenting the prevalence of family controlled business groups
in specific countries. For Taiwan, Chung and Mahmood (2006) document
considerable family equity stakes and involvement in management in 1988,
25 Somewhat related to this discussion is the phenomenon of foreign investors who are re-
luctant to invest in Indian groups (Khanna and Palepu 2000a) or, more generally, in firms
with concentrated family ownership in emerging markets with poor investor protection
(Leuz et al., 2006). This could be construed as evidence of tunneling which is, for some
reason, more acceptable to domestic investors than to foreigners (see also Perkins al.,
2006). However, these studies do not measure the extent to which pyramidal structures
in particular deter foreign investment.
26 Morck et al. (2000) make a similar point.
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followed by a rapid decline in the 1990s, which was accompanied by an
increase in the use of pyramids in order to maintain family control.27 In
Singapore, Tsui-Auch (2006) suggests that about a third of the top business
groups are family controlled (the rest are government linked). Family eq-
uity stakes are often above 50 percent, (without much change between 1996
and 2002), and family involvement in management is extremely high: in
nine of the top ten business groups the chairman is a family member; in all
but one of these firms, so is the CEO. In Malaysia, Gomez (2006) estimates
that thirty-five of the top fifty business groups in 1997 were family owned,
but the number has declined since the East Asian financial crisis; as in Sin-
gapore, other large groups are typically government linked. Claessens et
al. (2000) dis- cuss family firms as an important feature of Asian companies
more generally, and Jones (2000) regards historical British trading houses
operating in Asia as well-functioning family-controlled groups.
Not only is the evidence on the prevalence of family controlled groups
limited, there is also very little research on the extent to which considera-
tions affecting family firms influence the growth and behavior of business
groups. Some research on this question originates from an extensive litera-
ture within (economic) sociology, which views business groups as a family
organization, whose objective is tied to the social milieu (Orru` et al., 1997).
Diversification, for example, may be interpreted as a way to manage family
assets - firms are merely asset holders for lineage interests (Hamilton 1997),
although it is not clear from these studies why family assets cannot be di-
vided into independent companies without the group structure. There is
also no clear evidence in this literature - much of which is centered on East
Asia - on whether or not family oriented groups are more prevalent in East
Asia (where there is a special cultural emphasis on the family) than in other
regions; there are certainly non-Asian countries with extensive family in-
volvement in business groups: in Mexico, for instance, there is considerable
family influence in all of the eight largest groups.
Beyond pure family ties, the sociology literature regards groups as net-
work structures serving primarily social and cultural purposes, rather than
seeking to achieve economic objectives. Granovetter (2005) uses the mixed
evidence on the performance of group firms to suggest that considerations
other than economic efficiency may be at play. The importance of noneco-
nomic functions of business groups is reinforced, he argues, by the enor-
mous variation in structure of business groups around the world, which is
likely to reflect societal, cultural, institutional, and other norms going be-
yond standard economics. Factors such as inheritance customs (e.g., primo-
geniture or other), kinship structure, and even national ideology and pride,
may all play a role in shaping corporate groups in different environments.
Cultural edicts on how economic exchange should be arranged, rather than
27 See also Luo and Chung (forthcoming) on family and other social ties and group perfor-
mance in Taiwan.
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a rational response to missing markets or economic institutions, may ac-
count for differences in the structure of groups between, for example, South
Korea and Taiwan (Hamilton and Feenstra 1997; Hamilton 1997).
Moving from sociology to economics, issues raised by the literature on
family firms (primarily in the United States) such as succession, differences
between founder controlled firms and successor-controlled ones, the impor-
tance of family control versus family management, the tendency to use debt
finance and the link between all these and performance28 seem highly rel-
evant for understanding the link between families and business groups. A
recent working paper by Bertrand et al. (2004) is the first to examine these
issues systematically in the context of Thai business groups dominated by
ethnic Chinese families. Using elaborate data on seventy groups, they show
that the group structure is related to family history and evolution, for exam-
ple, to the number of male sons of the founder or to the number of broth-
ers he had. Bertrand et al. (2004) also attempt to relate diversification and
growth to family considerations, and to link group performance to intrafam-
ily feuds.29
The relation between family considerations and business group struc-
ture is apparently not specific to Thailand. Piramal (1998), for example,
provides anecdotes describing how intergenerational considerations influ-
ence the structure of business groups in India.30 In Israel, where contract-
ing institutions and the rule of law are considered highly developed, two
tycoons, controlling two of the largest business groups, admitted recently
that family considerations affected the number of companies in their groups
and the appointment of senior officers (The Marker, August 17, 2006). Com-
monwealth of Australia (1995) emphasizes family- related issues as determi-
nants of group structure in Indonesia, and describes family ties and inheri-
tance customs in ethnic Chinese business groups in several other East Asian
countries. There is also considerable evidence on the link between fami-
lies in business group structure and performance in South Korea. Chang
(2006) documents the rapidly declining equity stakes of the founding fam-
ilies of Hyundai and SK, whereas in other large groups family stakes were
historically smaller but have remained stable. Chang and Shin (2005) show
that group firms with large family stakes in South Korea do not outperform
28 See Morck et al. (2005) for further discussion of this literature.
29 See also Polsiri and Wiwattanakantang (2006) for information on the extensive involve-
ment of families in the ownership and management of business groups in Thailand.
30 The decision of Williamson Magor Group to acquire Union Carbide India in 1994 was ap-
parently prompted by the Khaitan familyaˆs worry about its offspringaˆs habits. aˆWorried
that their son . . . was spending too much time in their stable of three hundred horses,
Shanti (Khaitan) persuaded her husband to make an offer.... Deepak (Khatian) needed to
settle down, and she was convinced that a big company like Union Carbide would be just
the right ticket.aˆ Similarly, Kasturbhai Lalbhai, a cotton textile magnate, made four large
investments the period 1929-35, of which three were designed to sustain his nephewsaˆ
careers, and the fourth was to avoid disgracing the family name by bailing out an errant
family member.
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other members of the same group, in contrast with what one would expect
if extensive tunneling took place on behalf of the controlling families. Kim
(2006) studies the relation between family ownership and total factor pro-
ductivity and finds a positive relation for group firms.31
In addition to the influence of family considerations on group structure
and performance, the tendency of many groups to use debt rather than eq-
uity finance may be related to family ownership, reflecting a desire not to
dilute control (Chang 2003a discusses this in the context of the South Korean
chaebol). Thus, in contrast with the possible negative effects of business
groups on equity markets, many groups are large borrowers and important
bank clients. It is not clear, however, if this tendency is more pronounced in
family-controlled groups than in stand alone family firms.32
We regard the family-firms line of research on groups as highly promis-
ing, both with respect to the prevalence of family-controlled groups in dif-
ferent environments, and with respect to the interaction between family
considerations and group performance and efficiency. Contrasts between
business groups that are single-family controlled and those that are either
government controlled (in Singapore or in China) or are controlled by mul-
tiple families (e.g., LG in South Korea for at least part of its history or some
joint ventures between the Koc¸ and Sabanci groups in Turkey) would be
particularly interesting.
31 On the relation between performance of South Korean groups and the equity stakes of
insiders or family members, see also Chang (2003b), Kim et al. (2004), and Lim and Kim
(2005). Keister (2004) compares family and business group structure in South Korea and
China, and Amsden (1989) and Kim (1997) discuss the importance of families in South
Korea business groups more generally.
32 On various other aspects of debt finance in business groups, see Bianco and Nicodano
(2006) or Manos et al. (2004). Note also that leveraged business groups share some at-
tributes with leveraged buyout (LBO) organizations in the United States (we are grateful
to George P. Baker and Krishna Palepu for suggesting the analogy; George P. Baker and
Montgomery 1994 compare LBOs with American conglomerates). As in LBOs, each busi-
ness group affiliate is organized as a separate legal entity, with its own fiduciary respon-
sibilities, its own board, and its own disclosure regime. Just like LBO associations that
finance individual purchases with heavy leverage, business groups often launch new
ventures with financial support from financial intermediaries. In India, for example, a
typical new venture of the past few decades was launched with very little equity capital
from the entrepreneur (just as in an LBO) and a lot of (equity and) debt from domes-
tic institutional investors. There is also extensive evidence that the South Korean chaebol
were extremely heavily leveraged (Clifford 1994; Chang 2003a), a feature that made them
especially vulnerable during the Asian crisis of 1997-98. But the parallel between busi-
ness groups in emerging markets and American LBO organizations should not be taken
too far. Debt from Indian institutional investors or from government-controlled financial
institutions in South Korea would hardly have the disciplining character of debt from
American capital markets in the heyday of LBOs. Another striking difference is that LBO
organizations in the United States were forced to liquidate their investments within a de-
fined time period. This led to an independent measure of the value of each business (in
order to sell it), and to a powerful incentive structure, quite different from that prevailing
in the case of a business group in an emerging market.
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Analyzing groups from this perspective is, however, difficult for two
main reasons. First, while all of the studies discussed in this section focus
on the link between families and firm performance, performance might also
affect the stability of the familial contract and thereby the structure of fami-
lies. Bertrand et al. (2004) take a first step in addressing this issue when they
treat the number of male offsprings as an endogenous outcome. Second, in
many cultures, it is not at all clear that “what one sees is what one gets”
with regard to the family assets. In other words, the best assets of the family
might not be the publicly listed parts (Bertrand et al. 2004 and Khanna and
Palepu 1999a attempt to address this issue). Furthermore, the equity con-
tracts that are visible to the public observer and the social scientist might not
be the most meaningful contracts in systems where relationship contracting
predominates (Khanna and Thomas 2004).
4 Interactions Between Business Groups and So-
ciety
4.1 Business Groups, Politics, and Governments
This part of the taxonomy focuses on the nature of the interaction be-
tween business groups, governments and politics.33 Because business groups
have enjoyed close ties to their governments in many countries, it is not
surprising that the political economy literature on groups has often viewed
government-supported business groups as rent seeking “parasites.” Influ-
ential papers such as Bhagwati (1982) or Krueger (1974), while not directly
studying groups, have been used in support of arguments on rent-seeking
through the power exercised by incumbent businesses, typically family-
based business groups. Indeed, the interaction between groups and the
state has received much attention over the past few decades, to the extent
that an impression that all groups are deeply politically involved has been
generated:
Hypothesis 5: Business groups are formed with government support, expand
and diversify with government nurturing, and their performance is a function of
their rent-seeking ability and opportunities.
In general, there is substantial evidence supporting the first part of the
hypothesis - business groups in emerging markets are very often, though
not always, formed with government support. But as the groups evolve
and (some of) the countries develop, the relations between groups and gov-
ernments become far more complex so that there is considerable variation
in this dimension across groups and countries.
33 See a related discussion in Morck et al. (2005).
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4.1.1 Evidence on the Origins of Groups: The Role of Governments
In many countries, the very appearance of the business group phenome-
non was strongly influenced by government policies. The Japanese prewar
zaibatsu groups emerged as a result of a government privatization program
in the early 1880s, and expanded and diversified their activities in response
to government contracts awarded under preferential terms (Hadley 1970).
The South Korean business groups, the chaebol, enjoyed close ties to the
government of General Park; the government controlled the allocation of
credit and foreign currency, and the chaebol enjoyed preferential access to
these and other resources (e.g., Clifford 1994; Kim 1997; Chang 2003a). The
privatization policies of Prime Minister Mahathir’s government in Malaysia
enriched certain ethnic Malay-owned business groups dramatically (Gomez
and Jomo 1999).
The Salim group in Indonesia had family ties with President Suharto
and expanded, as did other Indonesian groups, with the assistance of gov-
ernment granted monopolies and licenses. Keister (1998 and 2004) describes
how the government actively encouraged the formation of business groups
in China and protected them from foreign competition. In Israel, family-
owned groups emerged as an outcome of certain government economic
policies (Maman 2002), and the rise of the “oligarchs” in Russia is yet an-
other recent (and very extreme) example of the emergence of groups under
the auspices of the government (Guriev and Rachinsky 2005).
Tables 4 through 7 present a comparative perspective on the origins of
business groups around the world. Table 4 confirms that government sup-
port is an important factor in the formation of business groups in many
environments. Nevertheless, even within countries where groups generally
enjoyed government support some groups emerged with little or no gov-
ernment favors (e.g., Samsung, see Table 5 on prewar Japan and Table 6 on
South Korea).34 Table 7 suggests that the vast majority of business groups
began as family dominated corporations, often with close ties to the govern-
ment.35
4.1.2 Evidence on the Relations between Mature Groups and Govern-
ments
While in most countries groups emerged with at least some degree of
government support, often in the context of development oriented mercan-
tilist policies, the relations between mature groups and the state can vary
34 Nevertheless, Kang (1997) argues that Samsungaˆs diversification was, at least partially,
driven by an attempt to maximize rents from the governmentaˆs preferential interest rate
policies.
35 Table 7 is based on detailed web-based and archival research by Hyunjee Kim for which
we are very grateful. Examples of groups that were not family controlled even early in
their development exist in Chile (Majluf et al. 1995) and in China (Keister 1998).
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Table 4 - The Comparative Origins of Business Groups: Historical Comparisons by
Country
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TABLE 4 
THE COMPARATIVE ORIGINS  OF BUSINESS  GROUPS: HISTORICAL COMPARISONS BY COUNTRY 
 
State-backing (general) Privatization-related Ethnic Policies and Family issues 
 
 
 
 
Brazil 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
China 
(since the 
1980s) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chile 
 
 
 
Costa 
Rica 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Czech 
Republic 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
India 
 
State protection (through tariffs and 
non-tariff barriers and through target- 
ing of priority sectors) benefited 
groups, as did extensive state financ- 
ing. In the 1990s protection decreased 
(although there is still some state 
backing in the form of technology and 
research grants and support). 
 
Government encouraged the forma- 
tion of many business groups and pro- 
tected them from foreign competition 
because they were regarded as essen- 
tial for development. However, gov- 
ernment sentiment waxed and waned 
depending on the fortune of business 
groups in neighboring countries, par- 
ticularly South Korea. In addition, the 
People’s Liberation Army has histori- 
cally been involved in several business 
ventures, many of which are organ- 
ized as business groups. 
 
Some groups benefited from the con- 
solidation policies following the crises 
of 1970s and 1980s. 
 
A limited role of the state combined 
with a historically homogeneous dis- 
tribution of land and coffee plants. 
However, government protection of 
some sectors (e.g., sugar, meat, rice) 
led to the growth of certain groups. 
 
Industrial holding companies emerged 
out of former Communist planning 
units, sometimes with 15–30 
horizontally and vertically linked plants 
and subsidiaries. These compa- nies 
were voucher-privatized and 
restructured using government subsi- 
dies. The remaining shares were 
bought at discount by the new man- 
agement team and consortia of Czech 
banks. 
 
Favored entrepreneurs formed 
groups during the License Raj of the 
1960s and 1970s (although other 
groups date back to the early twenti- 
eth century). This was despite the 
existence of de jure legislation that 
was anti-big business (e.g., the 
Monopolies and Restrictive Trade 
Practices Act). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Some groups benefited 
from privatization dur- 
ing the Pinochet regime. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Voucher privatization led 
to the creation of large, 
diversified invest- ment 
funds, often indi- rectly 
run by banks, which 
control linked 
enterprises. 
 
 
 
 
Some entrepreneurs 
who formed groups 
benefited from the 
transfer of assets for- 
merly held by the 
British to Indians dur- 
ing the Independence 
movement (de facto 
privatization). 
 
Family ties have always been at 
the center of groups and groups 
today are still owned and some- 
times run by the families that cre- 
ated them decades ago. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Family groups evolved, typically as 
a result of the success of specific 
firms, especially in commodities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Clusters of business groups formed 
around ethnic, religious and social 
communities, for exam- ple, the 
Marwaris of Rajasthan formed 
businesses in Bengal and 
elsewhere; the Gujeratis in the 
West, the Chettiars in the South, 
etc. 
 
(continued) 
considerably. In some circumstances, groups continue to enjoy close ties
with the authorities. Fisman (2001) provides convincing econometric esti-
mates of the value of political connections enjoyed by business groups in
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Table 4 - (continued)
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TABLE 4 (continued) 
 
State-backing (general) Privatization-related Ethnic Policies and Family issues 
 
 
 
Indonesia 
(under 
Suharto) 
 
 
 
 
Israel 
 
 
 
 
Italy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
South 
Korea 
(1960–90) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Malaysia 
(under 
Mahathir) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mexico 
Some groups run by members of the 
Suharto family. Others, such as the 
Salim group, were granted monopoly 
over mills. Close government 
involvement in business. State-spon- 
sored cement and other monopolies 
benefited groups. 
 
 
State backing of preferred groups in 
the early decades after independence. 
 
 
Government credit and protection of 
some groups in early postwar years 
(e.g., the Pesenti family who owned 
Pirelli). Some government-controlled 
groups as well. 
 
Preferential credit and protection from 
foreign competition to entrepre- neurs 
following government guide- lines, 
especially with political contacts to 
General Park. The government, through 
its control of the financial system, 
often encouraged group diversification, 
mergers and consolida- tion 
(acquisition of ailing firms and groups), 
and investment in certain industries. 
 
Preferential credit to businessmen 
with close ties, including members of 
Mahathir’s family. Political parties 
explicitly involved in business. 
Consolidation has often been used as 
a remedy to salvage distressed firms, 
particularly by grouping companies 
under favored Malay entrepreneurs. 
 
Until the mid 1980s, the government 
supported business groups by pro- 
tecting many sectors through tariffs 
and trade restrictions, as well as by 
granting discretionary concessions 
(for example, in media, mining, and 
other sectors), as well direct and indi- 
rect subsidies to certain goods and 
industries (e.g., sugar). Groups also 
enjoyed monopolies, state-induced 
consolidation and certain protection 
from FDI. Since 1973, groups and 
conglomerates have enjoyed certain 
special tax incentives. 
The Salim group received 
assets seized by the 
army. 
 
 
 
 
 
Privatization—transfer 
of some government 
assets to families and 
new groups in the 1990s. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sale of assets formerly 
controlled by the 
Japanese and of state 
assets to some favored 
groups and entrepre- 
neurs. 
 
 
 
 
 
Privatization (of colonial 
assets and of failed gov- 
ernment investments)— 
buyers have political 
contacts and state 
patronage. 
 
 
 
The privatization period 
(mostly 1988 to 1994) 
benefited many business 
groups which bought the 
national phone company 
(and was granted a 
monopoly for five years) 
and banks. Some new 
groups were created fol- 
lowing the privatization 
of the 1990s. 
Suharto viewed the involvement 
of his children in business groups 
as a way of righting the Pribumi- 
Chinese imbalance in the top 
ranks of the business community 
(although most groups are identi- 
fied as ethnic-Chinese, including 
the state-supported Salim group). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Prime Minister Mahathir supports 
Bumiputeras (indigenous Malay) 
entrepreneurs in the privatization 
processes. Some ethnic Chinese 
groups operate in Malaysia and 
across its borders (to diversify 
political risks). 
 
 
Family ties are crucial for busi- 
ness groups in Mexico. The 
largest industrial conglomerates in 
certain regions are still run by the 
families who started the business- 
es in the mid-nineteenth century, 
often with very strong ties to the 
government. 
 
(continued) 
http://www.rei.unipg.it/rei/article/view/174 29
REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND INSTITUTIONS, Vol. 6, Issue 1 - Winter-Spring 2015, Article 2
Table 4 - (continued)
Khanna and Yafeh: Business Groups in Emerging Markets 355  
 
TABLE 4 (continued) 
 
State-backing (general) Privatization-related Ethnic Policies and Family issues 
 
 
 
 
Nicaragua 
 
 
 
Pakistan 
(starting 
around 
1960) 
 
 
 
 
Russia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Singapore 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
South 
Africa 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Taiwan 
 
 
 
 
Thailand 
The government of the Somozas 
(father and son) controlled directly a 
large number of industries. At the 
end of the Sandinista government 
many firms were bankrupt and a few 
groups acquired them, leading to 
consolidation 
 
Foreign exchange licenses given pri- 
marily to rich families. Combined 
with restrictions on imports. 
 
 
Some (limited) government support of 
industry-led FIGs which evolved with 
the collapse of Communism; much 
more support of the bank-led FIGs 
which enjoy (enjoyed?) political clout, 
lobbying power for various privileges 
(e.g., restrictions on for- eign 
investors), and influence the media. 
 
 
 
Government-linked business groups 
established in the 1960s and 1970s in 
order to make economic investments 
jointly with private investors. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Not much government support and 
encouragement; family groups formed 
endogenously (but benefited from 
certain tax advantages starting in the 
1960s). 
 
Some groups originated in the 1940s; 
politicians and military officers often 
involved in business groups; restricted 
competition in many sectors favors 
groups. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Industry-led financial- 
industrial groups (FIGs) 
emerged early in the pri- 
vatization process. Bank- 
led FIGs emerged later, in 
relation to auctions 
initiated by President 
Yeltsin favoring (some) 
buyers; state assets sold 
at low prices to 
“Oligarchs.” 
Concentration in family groups, 
inherited from colonial times. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ethnic Chinese, who felt threat- 
ened by the government formed 
private, family controlled groups, 
diversifying across industries and 
borders to reduce risk. 
 
During Apartheid, major groups 
were associated with the whites; 
In the postapartheid period, the 
adoption of Black Economic 
Empowerment policies induced a 
transfer of assets from whites to 
blacks, and the formation of con- 
glomerates by select black entre- 
preneurs, some of whom had 
political contacts to the ANC. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Groups are often dominated by 
ethnic Chinese, some of whom 
operate in neighboring countries 
as well. 
 
(continued) 
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TABLE 4 (continued) 
 
State-backing (general) Privatization-related Ethnic Policies and Family issues 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Turkey 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nine- 
teenth 
Century 
Japan 
Between 1923 and 1980 some groups 
were supported through preferential 
input prices, low-cost credits, tax 
rebates, foreign exchange licenses, 
import licenses, government con- 
tracts, as well as through export-spe- 
cific measures allowing business groups 
to establish large export com- panies in 
the1980s. The government also 
encouraged diversification and 
internationalization of business groups 
via various economic incentives. (But 
several group-owned banks were 
taken over by the government after 
the bank crisis in 2001.) 
 
Some “political merchants” received 
state credit and grants. Ailing govern- 
ment businesses privatized and sold to 
the zaibatsu. Government contracts 
encouraged group growth around 
major wars. 
Relatively larger busi- 
ness groups are the 
favored participants in 
the privatization of state 
owned enterprises, espe- 
cially those with strong 
political ties. Smaller 
family groups participate 
in the privatization 
efforts of smaller state 
assets. 
The nineteenth century business 
elite was mostly composed of eth- 
nic minorities and foreign 
investors. With the founding of the 
new Turkish Republic in 
1923, the economic agenda 
stressed creating an indigenous 
business class: bureaucrats, mer- 
chants, and professionals were 
encouraged to become entrepre- 
neurs. 
 
Sources (in English): Brazil—Leff (1978), Suzingan and Villela (1997), and Musacchio (2004); Chile—Khanna 
and Palepu (1999a, 2000c); China—Keister (2004); Costa Rica—private communication with A. Condo; Czech 
Republic—McDermott (2002); India—Khanna and Palepu (1999a, 2000b, 2005) and Piramal (1998); Indonesia—
Commonwealth of Australia, Chapter 8, Schwarz (1994), Kompass Indonesia (1996) and Fisman (2001), Hanani 
(2006); Israel—Maman (2002); Italy—Aganin and Volpin (2005), Amatori (1997); Malaysia— Gomez and Jomo 
(1999) and Gomez (2006); Mexico—Gómez-Galvarriato (forthcoming); Nicaragua—Strachan (1976); Pakistan—
White (1974); Russia—Johnson (1997) and Guriev and Rachinsky (2005); Singapore—Tsui- Auch (2006); South 
Africa—McGregor (1998); Taiwan—Hamilton (1997) and Chung (2001); South Korea— Amsden (1989), Clifford 
(1994) and Chang (2003a); Thailand—Bertrand et al. (2004), Tara Siam (1996-97), Polsiri and Wiwattanakantang 
(2006); Turkey—Mango (2004), Yaprak et al. (2004), and Karademir et al. (2005); Prewar Japan—Morikawa 
(1992). 
(For Latin America, a general Spanish source is America Economica, 1997). 
 
 
and close ties between business groups and 
the government in Malaysia (see also 
Johnson and Mitton 2003). In India, some 
business groups were able to receive favor- 
able treatment from the “License Raj” in cer- 
tain periods (Dwijendra Tripathi 2004). 
There are yet more extreme examples of 
symbiosis between business groups and the 
government: each of the two major Japanese 
zaibatsu, Mitsui and Mitsubishi, virtually 
controlled one of the major parties in the 
Japanese parliament in the 1910s. More 
recently, some owners of South Korean chae- 
bol seemed to entertain political aspirations 
(e.g., Chairman Chung of Hyundai ran for 
president in 1993), a Turkish business group 
has launched a political party, allegedly so 
that their representation in government can 
confer political immunity on them (Andrew 
Mango 2004), and in Malaysia some business 
groups are centered on political parties (e.g., 
the Malay political party UMNO or the 
Chinese  political  party  MCA;  see  Gomez 
and Jomo 1999 and some discussion in 
Commonwealth of Australia 1995). Pramuan 
Bunkanwanicha and Wiwattanakantang 
(2005) describe Thai business tycoons who 
enter politics in order to win various govern- 
ment concessions, and in Singapore there 
are still some fully government controlled 
Indonesia during the Suharto regime (see also Leuz nd Oberholzer-Gee
2006). Gomez (2006, Appendix table 6.1) delineates the extensive and close
ties between busi ess groups and the government in Malaysia (see also
Johnson and Mitton 2003). In India, some business groups were able to re-
ceive favorable treatment from the “License Raj” in certain periods (Tripathi
2004). There are yet more extreme examples of symbiosis between business
groups and the government: each of the two major Japanese zaibatsu, Mitsui
and Mitsubishi, virtually controlled one of the major parties in the Japanese
parliament in the 1910s.
More recently, some owners of South Korean chaebol seemed to enter-
tain political aspirations (e.g., Chairman Chung of Hyundai ran for presi-
dent in 1993), a Turkish business group has launched a polit cal party, al-
legedly so that their representation in overnment can confer political im-
munity on them (Mango 2004), and in Malaysia some business groups are
centered on political parties (e.g., the Malay political party UMNO or the
Chinese politic l party MCA; see Gomez and Jomo 1999 and some disc s-
sion in C mmonwealth of Australia 1995). Bunk nwanicha and Wiwat-
tanakantang (2005) describe Thai business tycoons who enter politics in or-
der to win various government concessions, and in Singapore there are still
some fully gover ment controlled business groups (Temasek, for example,
which controls Singapore Airlines).
But governments and business groups do not always operate symbiot-
ically. First, there are a number of historical examples when governments
harmed, rather than assisted, business groups. This has happened both in
times of wrenching societal transformation - e.g., when the Chinese Com-
munist Party took power in 1949 - and in an ongoing sense when groups
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TABLE 5 
THE COMPARATIVE ORIGINS  OF BUSINESS: GROUP-SPECIFIC ORIGINS  IN NINETEENTH CENTURY  JAPAN 
 
Origin Growth and Relations with the State 
 
Mitsui* 
Mitsubishi* 
Sumitomo* 
Yasuda* 
 
Asano 
Fujita 
Furukawa 
 
Okura 
 
Dates back to 1673 (dry goods); “political 
merchants”1 who provided financial services 
to the Tokugawa regime since the late seven- 
teenth century. 
 
Founded by a former Samurai after the Meiji 
Restoration. 
 
 
Dates back to the late sixteenth century, with 
ties to the Tokugawa regime. 
 
 
“Political merchants” from the Meiji 
Restoration period. Mainly provided finan- 
cial services (including the establishment of 
the third national bank in 1876). 
 
Around 1870; no previous political ties. 
 
 
 
Origin: supplier of goods and engineering 
works to the new government (with contacts 
to major figures in the Meiji government). 
 
Formed in 1874, related to old wealth from 
the Ono family. 
 
 
Merchant (groceries) before the Meiji 
Restoration; converted into gun production 
in the 1860s and then into overseas trading 
starting 1873. 
 
Historically close ties with various governments. 
Growth and diversification through acquisitions and 
through establishment of new businesses, in part 
through government privatization and contracts. 
 
Initial investment in shipping enjoyed government 
protection, subsidies, loans etc. Subsequent growth 
and diversification patterns broadly similar to 
Mitsui’s. 
 
Diversified from mining into trading, finance and 
industry. Again, diversification and growth through 
both acquisitions and through the establishment of 
new businesses, with government support. 
 
Less diversified than the other big groups, more 
focused on banking and finance. Again, both acqui- 
sitions and new businesses as mechanisms of 
growth. 
 
Initial fortune out of various investments. Growth 
through cooperation with a separate financial insti- 
tution. 
 
 
An internal family feud led to the dissolution of this 
group and its reorganization as the Kuhara zaibatsu 
in 1905. 
 
Mostly in mining and utilities, e.g., established the first 
hydroelectric power plant in 1890. Characterized by 
more vertical integration (e.g., in copper extrac- tion 
and production) than diversification. 
 
Growth mainly through acquisitions. Despite sub- 
stantial operations overseas, government contracts 
remained a major source of income. 
 
 
1 This refers to the Japanese term seisho which is defined by Morikawa (1992, p. 3) as “traders and financiers who 
used their ties to powerful political figures to obtain government favors, enabling them to earn substantial profit in 
return for providing goods and services to the state. Government patronage took the form of subsidies, grants and 
monopolies or special privileges, favorable credit arrangements, and sales of state enterprises at nomi- nal prices.” 
 
Source: Morikawa (1992). * denotes the big four zaibatsu groups. 
 
 
 
business  groups  (Temasek,  for  example, 
which controls Singapore Airlines). 
But governments and business groups do 
not always operate symbiotically. First, 
there are a number of historical examples 
when governments harmed, rather than 
assisted, business groups. This has hap- 
pened both in times of wrenching societal 
transformation—e.g., when the Chinese 
Communist Party took power in 1949—and 
in an ongoing sense when groups struggled 
in the face of an inimical state—e.g., India’s 
socialist government in the few decades 
following Indian independence; indeed 
Khanna and Palepu (2005) point out that the  
turnover  in  leading  Indian  groups 
[1] This refers to the Japanese term seisho which is defined by Morikawa (1992, p. 3) as ”traders and financiers
who used their ties to powerful political figures to obtain government favors, enabling them to earn substantial profit
in return for providing goods and services to the state. Government patronage took the form of subsidies, grants
and monopolies or special privileges, favorable credit arrangements, and sales of state enterprises at nominal
prices.”
(*) denotes the big four zaibatsu groups
Source: Morikawa (1992).
struggled in the face of an inimical state - e.g., India’s socialist government
in the few decades following Indian independence; indeed Khanna and
Palepu (2005) point out that the turnover in leading Indian groups across
th past sixty years is far too hig to be c nsistent with entrenchment an
close group-government ties. In Pinochet’s Chile, after the fall of Allende’s
Socialist government in 1973, pro-free-market and antiownership concen-
tration policies were adopted, which were sometimes antibusiness groups.
In South Korea, Siegel (2006) shows that political regime changes lead to
differences in the particular firms that receive government favors according
to social ties between the office holder and senior managers. Furthermore,
even within the same group, different affiliates may either be favored or
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TABLE 6 
THE COMPARATIVE ORIGINS  OF BUSINESS  GROUPS: GROUP-SPECIFIC ORIGINS  IN PRESENT-DAY SOUTH  KOREA 
 
Origin Growth and Relations with the State 
 
Hyundai 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Daewoo 
 
 
 
 
 
Samsung 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LG 
SK 
 
Mr. Chung (the founder) started by 
providing mechanical services to 
the American army; later estab- 
lished contacts with the Syngman 
Rhee regime. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mr. Kim (the founder) was the son 
of General Park’s teacher. Group 
established in 1967. 
 
 
 
Mr. Lee (the founder) established 
the company in 1938, using some 
inherited wealth. Acquisition of 
assets left by the Japanese in 1945. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Founded as a trading company in 
1947. 
 
 
Founded in 1957; close ties with 
the government since inception. 
 
Together with Daewoo, one of General Park’s favored groups 
in the 1970s, when Hyundai cooperated with the government’s 
policy of investment in heavy and chemical industries. 
Obtained licenses and government finance as well as preferen- 
tial tax treatment and protection from imports. Growth 
through both acquisitions and entry into new industries. 
Allegedly, Hyundai and other big groups used government 
contacts to improve their competitive positions, occasionally 
by acquiring assets of ailing groups and by winning major gov- 
ernment contracts. Mr. Chung was General Park’s “informal 
construction minister” and a personal friend. 
 
Close relations with the government, which transferred to 
Daewoo the Okpo shipyard and some assets in the auto 
industry previously owned by GM. Government-induced 
investments in heavy industry. Expansion mainly through 
acquisitions. Strong international orientation (overseas invest- 
ments). 
 
Samsung was relatively large already in the 1950s; made polit- 
ical “donations” and established contacts in government. But 
relations with the state were turbulent in comparison with the 
other major groups: General Park forced Samsung to 
“donate” some of its assets soon after taking power, and for a 
while the group was virtually excluded from most government 
contracts. Instead, growth fostered through cooperation with 
foreign firms; relative focus on electronics. Growth and diver- 
sification in 1960s through both acquisitions and establish- 
ment of new businesses. 
 
Growth mostly in electronics and chemicals; benefited from 
government development plans in the 1960s; related diversifi- 
cation strategy. 
 
Much of its growth driven by acquisition of privatized state 
assets (including property left by the Japanese), through close 
ties to the government, including the marriage of the founder’s 
son to the daughter of President Roh. 
 
Source: Clifford (1994) and Chang (2003a). 
 
 
across the past sixty years is far too high to 
be consistent with entrenchment and close 
group–government ties. In Pinochet’s 
Chile, after the fall of Allende’s Socialist 
government in 1973, pro-free-market and 
antiownership concentration policies were 
adopted, which were sometimes antibusi- 
ness groups. In South Korea, Jordan Siegel 
(2006) shows that political regime changes 
lead to differences in the particular firms that 
receive government favors according 
to social ties between the office holder and 
senior managers. Furthermore, even with- in 
the same group, different affiliates may 
either be favored or punished depending 
on their CEO or Chairman’s social ties to the 
current political regime. In the United 
States, Morck (2005) and Morck and 
Yeung (2005) describe how President 
Roosevelt took policy measures against 
business groups (see table 4 for other 
examples). 
S r : liff r (1994) and Chang (2003a).).
punished depending on their CEO or Chairman’s social ties to the current
political regime. In the United States, Morck (2005) and Morck and Yeung
(2005) describe how President Roosevelt took policy measures against busi-
ness groups (see Table 4 for other examples).
Even where governments wer not hostile t ward business groups, the
relationship between them often changed over time, as groups became stron-
ger and more independent. This seems to have been the case in Japan in the
1930s (Franks et al., 2006) and in South Korea starting in the 1980s (Ams-
den 1989; Clifford 1994; Kim 1997; Chang 2003a; Lee et al. 2002), where
the expression the “Republic of Samsung” is sometimes used. In post-1997
South Korea, the government has actively tried to weaken the chaebol al-
beit with limited success in view of their power and influence (although
Borensztein and Lee, 2002 provide evidence that group firms lost their pref-
erential access to capital following the crisis). The overall conclusion from
this evidence is that as business groups accumulate political and economic
http://www.rei.unipg.it/rei/article/view/174 33
REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND INSTITUTIONS, Vol. 6, Issue 1 - Winter-Spring 2015, Article 2
Table 7 - The Comparative Origins Of Business Groups: Initial Control Structure Of
Business Groups
Khanna and Yafeh: Business Groups in Emerging Markets 359  
 
 
TABLE 7 
THE COMPARATIVE ORIGINS  OF BUSINESS  GROUPS: INITIAL  CONTROL  STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS  GROUPS 
 
 
 
Family 
 
Others 
 
Indonesia 
 
Nearly Complete 
 
Some state involvement 
Malaysia High (90+ percent) State involvement and 
some foreign investment 
Thailand High (80 percent) Some state involvement 
Turkey Nearly Complete N/A 
Mexico High (90 percent) Some state involvement 
Sources: The table is based on detailed archival, web-based, and interviews by Hyunjee Kim. ISI 
Emerging Markets Database, One Source Database, Hoover’s Database, Datamonitor Company Report, 
websites and annual reports. Data refer to the largest firms within the largest groups in each country. 
Family control is defined as having the founding family holding at least 20 percent of the equity during 
the first decade after the group was founded. In Malaysia, for example, over 90 percent of the group 
firms examined satisfy this criterion. 
 
 
 
Even where governments were not hostile 
toward business groups, the relationship 
between them often changed over time, as 
groups became stronger and more inde- 
pendent. This seems to have been the case 
in Japan in the 1930s (Franks, Mayer, and 
Miyajima 2006) and in South Korea starting 
in the 1980s (Amsden 1989; Clifford 1994; 
Kim 1997; Chang 2003a; Chung H. Lee, Lee, 
and Kangkook Lee 2002), where the 
expression the “Republic of Samsung” is 
sometimes used. In post-1997 South Korea, 
the government has actively tried to weaken 
the chaebol albeit with limited success in 
view of their power and influence (although 
Eduardo  Borensztein  and  Jong-Wha  Lee 
2002 provide evidence that group firms lost 
their preferential access to capital following 
the crisis). The overall conclusion from this 
evidence is that as business groups accumu- 
late political and economic influence, the 
nature of their relations with government 
tends to change—from government pro- tégés 
to a strong lobby with often captured 
regulators (in line with phenomenon of 
“entrenchment” emphasized by Morck, 
Wolfenzon, and Yeung 2005) or to a sector 
that loses favor with the authorities because 
of its excessive influence.36 
 
4.1.3 The Welfare Implications of Close Ties 
between Groups and Governments 
 
The prevailing assumption in much of the 
literature is that government support of 
groups is socially harmful. Despite the nega- 
tive implications of government favors of the 
type described above, there may also be a 
bright side: business groups may have 
helped governments orchestrate a “big 
push” in several sectors simultaneously 
(arguably in prewar Japan, see, for example, 
Kazushi Ohkawa and Henry Rosovsky 1973). 
In other cases, governmental favoritism 
towards business groups controlled by an 
ethnic minority may have helped preserve 
 
 
 
36 The changing relations between groups and govern- 
ment may be related also to changes in the ownership 
structure of business groups over time. For example, in 
Indonesia or Mexico, foreigners often hold very signifi- 
cant equity stakes in business groups firms—many group 
firms among the largest business groups in Indonesia, 
Mexico, and South Africa have foreign ownership of 20 
percent or more. This may affect the nature of ties between 
groups and politicians. 
Source: The table is as iled ival, eb-based, terviews by yunjee i . ISI Emerging
Markets Databas , One Source Database, Hooveraˆs Database, Datamonitor Company Report, websites and
annual reports. Data refer to the largest firms within the largest groups in each country. Family control is defined
as having the founding family holding at least 20 percent of the equity during the first decade after the group was
founded. In Malaysia, for example, over 90 percent of the group firms examined satisfy this criterion.
influence, the nature of their relations with government tends to change -
from government prote´ge´s to a strong lobby with often captured regulators
(in line with phenomenon of “entrenchment” mphasiz d by Morck et al.,
2005) or to a sector that loses favor with the authorities because of its exces-
sive influence.36
4.1.3 T Welfare Implications of Close Ties between Groups and Gov-
ernments
The prevailing ass mption in much of the literature is that government
support of groups is socially harmful. Despite the negative implications of
government favors of the type described above, there may also be a bright
side: business groups may have helped governments orchestrate a “big
push” in several sectors simultaneously (arguably in prewar Japan, see,
for example, Ohkawa and Rosovsky 1973). In other cases, governmental
favoritism towards business groups controlled by an ethnic inority may
have h lpe pr serve s cial equilibrium, s in Malaysia. The appropriate
counterfactual against which this government polic should be judged may
well be race riots and chaos. Si ilar government-directed transfers are cur-
rently being attempted in South Africa, under the label of Black Economic
Empowerment, with groups forming around emergent successful black en-
trepreneurs in the post- Apartheid regime - agai , the ove all ec nomic
36 The changing relations between groups and government may be related also to changes
in the ownership structure of business groups over time. For example, in Indon -
sia or Mexico, foreigners often hold very si nific t equity stakes in business groups
firmsaˆmany group firms among the largest business groups in Indonesia, Mexico, and
South Africa have foreign ownership of 20 percent or more. This may affect the nature of
ties between groups and politicians.
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value of such a policy is not easy to gauge.37
Social welfare might be enhanced by group government liaisons if, for
instance, the relation between groups and governments supports tax col-
lection and fiscal policy. Do governments favor groups because it is easy
to collect taxes from them? If so, this would be reminiscent of medieval
rulers who partitioned their territories into fiefdoms con- trolled by quasi-
independent lords who could rule them as they saw fit as long as they paid
their taxes to the government. This issue has rarely been addressed in the
literature. Morikawa (1992) notes that taxes collected from the Japanese za-
ibatsu during World War II were substantial. By contrast, Morck (2005) de-
scribes how the U.S. tax authorities felt that collecting taxes from business
groups was especially difficult because of tunneling, and so supported (per-
haps even initiated) President Roosevelt’s attack on business groups. Chang
(2003a) suggests that South Korean groups shift funds so as to reduce their
tax liability. Desai et al. (forthcoming) argue that inefficient corporate gover-
nance structures associated with the expropriation of the rights of minority
shareholders are likely to be associated also with tax evasion (expropriation
of the government’s rights). Clearly, more systematic evidence on this issue
from various countries would be of interest.
Analytically, it might not always be sensible to study just the interaction
between the private sector and the government, without considering addi-
tional constituencies. For example, Musacchio (2004) argues that the rise
of business groups (and concentrated ownership) in Brazil coincided with
the rising power of organized labor, with the government playing only a
background role. Huang (2003) discusses the general suppression of the in-
digenous private sector in China. This analysis, along with Keister’s (2004)
study of the forced formation of business groups in China, suggests that the
government favors business groups formed by the state but discriminates
against business groups formed by private entities.
In some countries, the government might itself be in transition, affect-
ing the formation and evolution of business groups. In Czechoslovakia, for
example, newly formed groups reflected new networks of companies, as
power shifted from the Communist government to the regime that replaced
it (McDermott 2002; see also Stark, 1996 on post-Communist corporate net-
works in Hungary).38
37 The relevant legislation is the broad-based Black Economic Empowerment Bill, no. 53, of
2003.
38 Somewhat related is a historical anecdote from early twentieth century British India,
when the Birla group supported and financed indigenous Indian businesses and en-
trepreneurs as an alternative to the British-dominated business scene (Piramal 1998; Tri-
pathi 2004).
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4.1.4 Evidence on the Political Ability of Groups to Shape their Environ-
ment
Can business groups use their political clout to shape their business en-
vironment? This central question has no systematic answer in the existing
literature. Historically, groups have often invested in market supporting in-
frastructure and launched new industries - the Japanese zaibatsu are a good
example. There are also claims that business groups in Mexico exerted in-
fluence in favor of free trade with the United States from which the groups
were hoping to benefit. Kim (1997) argues that the South Korean groups lob-
bied for liberalization in the 1980s, and Chari and Gupta (2006) show that
in India industries with high presence of group-affiliated firms were more
likely to be associated with liberalization of foreign entry in the early 1990s
than industries dominated by state owned firms.39 By contrast, groups may
resist certain political reforms, improvements in minority shareholder pro-
tection or antitrust legislation - this seems to be the case in South Korea in
recent years (Chang 2003a). Morck et al. (2005) argue that “entrenchment”
through political clout is often used by business groups to restrict entry and
competition. Rajan and Zingales (2003) also express concern about the abil-
ity of business incumbents (not specifically groups) to curtail competition
and free financial markets. The ability of groups to shape their environment
may also be related to attempts by business groups in many countries to
gain influence on the media (Karademir and Danisman, 2006 describe this
for the case of Turkey).
Two conclusions emerge from this discussion. First, political economy
explanations for the formation and effectiveness of groups, beyond the tra-
ditional focus on government favors, should receive more attention. Sec-
ond, it might be fruitful to view the relations between groups and the state
as the equilibrium outcome of a game, in the spirit of work by Aoki (2001)
and Greif (2006). These games are typically complex, and their application
to a particular context is not always straightforward. Nevertheless, concep-
tually, the result of such a government business group game might well be
rent seeking and cohabitation, but it might also be an uneasy coexistence,
quite distinct from the outcome of groups currying favor with the state.40
4.2 Business Groups and Monopoly Power
There are good theoretical reasons to suspect that business groups may
wield considerable market power. They may, under some circumstances,
drive their rivals out of markets, or prevent entry, due to their “deep pock-
39 This is in some contradiction to Tripathi (2004), who argues that the Bombay Club (of
Indian industrialists) lobbied for restricted entry of foreign multinationals.
40 It would be interesting to model the relation between ties with the government and the
business group structure, in contrast with politically connected firms operating in one
industry.
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ets,” “first mover advantage,” and ties to the government. “Multimarket
contact” (Bernheim and Whinston, 1990) between diversified business gro-
ups competing with each other repeatedly in many sectors may facilitate
collusion. And business groups may bundle together different group prod-
ucts in order to extract more rents from distributors and ultimate buyers.
It is not clear, however, if these considerations are the rationale behind the
formation of business groups.
Hypothesis 6: (a) Business group formation should involve horizontal merg-
ers, vertical foreclosure, entry deterrence, and other mechanisms designed to in-
crease market power. (b) Monopoly power should be reflected in high profit rates. (c)
Group presence should be especially pronounced in environments where monopoly
rents can be extracted such as industries and countries with trade barriers and weak
antitrust enforcement.
4.2.1 Evidence on Business Groups and Monopoly Power
The theoretical conjectures associating business groups with monopoly
power enjoyed popular support in the past, albeit without rigorous empir-
ical tests. The view that business groups harm competition dates back to
the Great Depression in the United States. Morck (2005) argues that Presi-
dent Roosevelt sought to dissolve America’s groups (by taxing intercorpo-
rate dividends) partly on these grounds. One of the primary objectives of
the postwar American occupation reforms in Japan was the dissolution of
the prewar zaibatsu, which was driven by strong views on their anticompet-
itive effects and the resulting social tension that may have contributed to
the rise of militarism in Japan (Hadley 1970; Yafeh 1995). Ginette Kurgan-
Van Hentenryk (1997) suggests the Belgian business groups facilitated the
cartelization of the Belgian coal industry in the interwar period.
Nevertheless, despite the plausibility of arguments on groups and mono-
poly power, the literature on the industrial organization effects of business
groups has not developed much. The theoretical relation between group
affiliation and entry deterrence is explored formally in an interesting recent
study by Cestone and Fumagalli (2005). They show that internal capital
markets are not always advantageous to group affiliated firms when they
try to deter entry; under certain conditions they may actually be “softer”
than stand-alone firms.41 There seems to be scope for many more theoreti-
cal analyses of groups and industrial organization.
Empirical evidence on the hypothesis that business groups restrict com-
petition is surprisingly scarce. Casual observation suggests that not all gro-
ups enjoy high profit rates and monopoly rents (Table 1). The few studies
directly testing the monopoly power of business groups use not very re-
41 See also Faure-Grimaud and Inderst (2005) who discuss related issues in the context of
conglomerates with internal capital markets. Feenstra and Hamilton (2006) also discuss
monopoly power of business groups in a different context.
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cent data from developed economies: Encaoua and Jacquemin (1982) inves-
tigate French industrial groups and find little evidence of their having any
market power (although the econometric techniques used in empirical in-
dustrial organization have evolved significantly since then); Weinstein and
Yafeh (1995) argue that (in the 1980s) Japan’s bank-centered groups com-
peted aggressively against each other rather than colluded. Although there
are no similar studies for emerging markets, there are occasional descrip-
tions of the intense rivalry between the South Korean chaebol. These are
not formally substantiated, and even if true, do not necessarily preclude
anticompetitive entry deterrence. Other anecdotes refer to collusion across
ethnic Chinese business groups in East Asia (Commonwealth of Australia
1995). Mobarak and Purbasari (2005) provide more systematic evidence -
they show how politically connected Indonesian business groups used their
influence during Suharto’s reign to win exclusive import licenses conferring
protection from imports, market power, and competitive advantage relative
to their rivals, leading to increased concentration. There is also fairly sys-
tematic evidence on changes in the relative size and rankings of business
groups over time, which could be interpreted as evidence of competition or
erosion of monopoly power - the list of top ten business groups has changed
dramatically over the past three decades in India and Taiwan, but has re-
mained very stable in South Korea and Thailand.42 It is not clear, however,
why groups in some countries wield less power to restrict entry than groups
in other countries. Overall it is surprising that no attempts have been made
to use modern NEIO (New Empirical Industrial Organization) techniques
to assess the market power of business groups in emerging markets.
5 Directions for Future Research
This final section outlines general directions for future research in view
of what we believe we know, and what we would like to know, about busi-
ness groups in emerging markets.
5.1 Origin and Formation of Business Groups
The formation of business groups remains largely unexplained. Because
of this lacuna, selection effects may render comparisons of groups and non-
group firms invalid. We view this as an important direction for both theo-
retical and empirical future research.
42 In India, only three of the top ten groups in 1969 were included in the list of top ten
groups in 1997. Taiwan is similar to India in this respect: only three of the top ten groups
of 1973 appear on the list for 2002. By contrast, in South Korea, six of the top groups
in 1972 were among the top ten groups in 1996, and in Thailand too, six of the top ten
groups in 1979 appeared on the list of top ten business groups in 1997 (Khanna and
Palepu 2005; Chung and Mahmood 2006; Chang 2003a; Polsiri and Wiwattanakantang
2006, respectively).
Copyright c© 2015 University of Perugia Electronic Press. All rights reserved 38
Khanna, Yafeh: Business Groups in Emerging Markets: Paragons or Parasites?
The existing theoretical literature on the formation of business groups
consists of no more than a handful of models. Kali (1999) studies the en-
dogenous formation of business networks in response to limited contract
enforcement by the legal system; Maurer and Sharma (2001) also focus on
imperfect property rights. Ghatak and Kali (2001) and Kali (2003) empha-
size imperfect information in capital markets as another possible motive.
Almeida and Wolfenzon (forthcoming) offer a theoretical explanation for
the formation of pyramidal groups which is based on the ability of control-
ling shareholders to access the cash flows of all group firms so as not to
rely on underdeveloped external financial markets. A particularly intrigu-
ing theoretical direction (also related to underdeveloped financial markets)
would relate the formation of groups to risk attitudes: are groups a mutual
insurance arrangement attracting risk-averse economic agents? Kim (2004)
is the only existing model along these lines.43
Existing empirical studies of the formation of groups are often based on
small data sets and employ empirical techniques that are not fully convinc-
ing. For example, Chung (2001, 2006) examines the origin and evolution of
groups in Taiwan, distinguishing between reasons related to market forces,
culture, and societal institutions, but the relative empirical importance of
these factors is hard to disentangle. Tsui-Auch (2005) documents a tendency
among ethnic Chinese entrepreneurs in Singapore to form diversified busi-
ness organizations (in comparison with ethnic Indian entrepreneurs), and
attributes this interesting observation to the cultural heterogeneity of the
Chinese community. The empirical support for this claim, however, is sus-
pect because of other systematic differences in the background of Chinese
and Indian entrepreneurs in Singapore. More sophisticated empirical anal-
yses of the differential origins of business groups are likely to be valuable.
Somewhat related conceptually is the idea to use within-country vari-
ation in the structure and development of business groups to draw some
conclusions on the forces that lead to their formation. For example, it ap-
pears that the Chinese government pursued liberalization primarily in re-
gions where it was weak (the south), and not in the Northeast (e.g., Beijing)
where the Communist Party had its pre-1949 stronghold. Is it the case then
that state-sponsored groups created by fiat are developing primarily in the
Northeast? Variation in group presence across Indian provinces might shed
light on the relation between the formation of business groups and issues
related to ethnic identity and perhaps also to “trust.” For example, is it pos-
sible to map the presence of certain ethnic groups in certain regions (e.g.,
Marwaris in Rajasthan and, by migration, in Bengal; Chettiars in the south)
to the formation and development of groups along similar ethnic lines? In-
dian business groups offer an opportunity to take advantage of the variation
43 The empirical evidence in Munshi and Rosenzweig (2005) on informal mutual insurance
institutions in India, and in Abramitzky (2005) on the Israeli Kibbutz may offer some
useful related insights.
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over time in the processes that led to the formation - some groups, like the
Tatas and Birlas were created by indigenous entrepreneurs during the time
of the British Empire; a second wave, like the Goenkas and the Khaitans,
were the product of the post-independence (1947) transfer of assets from
the British to Indians; a third set originated during India’s “License Raj” of
the 1960s and 1970s. Can these different circumstances be related to group
structure?
5.2 Evolution and Dynamics of Business Groups
Historical and dynamic (over a long period of time) perspectives of busi-
ness groups can enrich our understanding of this institution in several ways.
First, it would be interesting to compare the validity of cross-sectional ex-
planations for the ubiquity and performance of business groups with time-
series based perspectives (Jones and Khanna 2006) - do groups evolve in a
fashion that is consistent with missing institutions, risk sharing, tunneling,
use of a scarce resource, etc.? The Japanese prewar zaibatsu provide an obvi-
ous opportunity to carry out such an analysis because of the wealth of infor-
mation about their activities and development, providing over five decades
of data.44 Another possibility is the shorter, but more recent history of the
South Korean chaebol.45 There are other interesting examples: Maurer and
Sharma (2001) study the evolution of nineteenth century Mexican business
groups (which, in their view, was a response to limited contract enforce-
ment); Khanna and Palepu (2005) study the evolution of business groups in
India (which, they argue, fits the view of groups as a substitute for under-
developed institutions; see also Jones 2000 on historical British groups); and
Aganin and Volpin (2005) study the evolution of Italian groups (focusing on
investor protection and political issues).
Many more historical studies with explicit hypotheses in mind, espe-
cially with competing hypotheses whose testable implications can be con-
trasted in time-series data, could shed further light on the evolution of gro-
ups, on path dependence (ways in which“history matters”), and on the rai-
son d’eˆtre of group formation and development.
44 Morikawa (1992) is the most detailed English-language study of these groups with a
plethora of information on their origins, evolving relations with the government, growth
and diversification patterns, controlling families, human resource management, and
more. He tends to interpret the zaibatsu growth and diversification history in a Chand-
lerian tradition of efficient management and use of internal resources. The evidence he
provides, however, is not really set up in a way that enables testing competing hypothe-
ses about the reasons for the existence and growth of these groups
45 Chang (2003a) argues that, much like the Japanese zaibatsu in the late nineteenth century,
South Korea’s business groups developed under the auspices of a development-oriented
government, but gradually became independent and pursued a growth strategy that re-
flected their resources and competitive advantages.
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5.3 Longevity of Business Groups
Although there is no systematic evidence on the question whether or not
the longevity of group affiliates exceeds that of otherwise comparable, un-
affiliated firms, in many countries, very long-lived groups can be found. In
some cases, groups have survived, without a substantial change in struc-
ture, over a long period, starting in an era when the country was poor,
all the way to prosperity (e.g., Sweden).46 tends to coincide with dramatic
changes in government policy.47 Can groups ever die peacefully? We are
not sure. One of the few examples of such a process is provided by Jones
(2000), who describes the demise (or refocus) of British trading houses dur-
ing recent decades in response to a changing environment (rise of diver-
sified institutional investors in London, decolonization abroad, decline in
trade in raw materials, etc.). Morck et al. (2005) show that Canadian pyra-
mids died peacefully in the mid twentieth century due to market crashes,
inheritance taxes, and other factors, but new groups arose to replace them
in the later decades of the century. There is also some recent evidence on
the on-going, gradual decline of cross shareholding in Japanese corporate
groups (Okabe 2002; Yafeh 2003; Miyajima and Kuroki, forthcoming). By
contrast, recent evidence suggests that the business group phenomenon in
much of East Asia did not disappear following the 1997 crisis, although
some groups did collapse and others were forced to restructure. For exam-
ple, Chung and Mahmood (2006) show that Taiwanese groups became more
diversified both across industries and across countries following the crisis;
they also became more pyramidal in structure. TsuiAuch (2006) examines
both government owned and privately owned groups controlled by eth-
nic Chinese in Singapore, finding certain gradual changes toward increased
focus but much continuity. Gomez (2006) documents significant weaken-
ing of Malaysian groups with the demise of their patrons, Prime Minister
Mahathir and other politicians in Malaysia, like Daim and Anwar. Polsiri
and Wiwattanakantang (2006) describe the restructuring of Thai business
groups and Hanani (2006) of Indonesian groups. None of these studies
suggests that, despite the crisis and the ensuing changes, the dissolution
of business groups in any of these countries is imminent. Are there cultural
or societal reasons that would prevent corporate structure in emerging mar-
kets from self-evolving into a more focused structure as the country devel-
46 For a brief discussion of the history and survival of the Wallenberg group, the largest in
Sweden, over the past 150 years, see the Economist, Oct. 14, 2006, p. 94
47 For example, President Roosevelt deliberately attempted to dismantle American big
businesses during the Great Depression (Morck 2005; Morck and Yeung 2005), which
may explain why he could muster the necessary political will. The American occupation
authorities forcefully dissolved the Japanese zaibatsu after World War II (Yafeh 1995).
The South Korean government attempted to curb the power of the major chaebol follow-
ing the Asian financial crisis of 1997aˆ98 (Khanna and Palepu 1999b; Chang 2003a) with
limited success.
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ops? What is the role of government in this process? Is it advisable, or even
possible, for the state to forcibly dismantle groups, as has been attempted in
South Korea? Even if groups have run their course, is it clear that the desired
policy is to try and dissolve them (Khanna and Palepu 1999b)? Is a policy of
benign neglect more desirable (as in India)? Is it clear that when the social
costs of corporate groups exceed their social benefits, private costs to group
owners will also exceed private benefits? Can groups involving substantial
inefficiencies persist for a long time? If so, is it because of a weak corporate
control environment? Because of social reasons (e.g., families who diversify
to accommodate disparate interests of the next generation)? These are com-
plex theoretical issues. At present, we are aware of only one study that tries
to address them: Almeida and Wolfenzon (2006) argue that because of nega-
tive externalities (on the ability of nongroup firms to raise finance) business
groups do not realize the full cost of their presence (and presumably will
not dissolve on their own even when it is optimal to do so).
5.4 Counterfactuals to Business Groups
When considering the welfare consequences of groups, it is unclear what
the appropriate counterfactual should be: against what alternative should
groups be evaluated? The ideal is a well functioning market economy, but in
reality the world consists of distant second-bests. In the absence of groups,
would there be other forms of networks? Would market-supporting institu-
tions emerge spontaneously? Is there a way to infer the appropriate coun-
terfactual from recent policy interventions (e.g., in South Korea or China)?
Almeida and Wolfenzon (2006), who evaluate the welfare implications of
business groups as a function of measures of efficiency of external finan-
cial markets, provide an interesting starting point for addressing this issue.
Also relevant is the model of Maksimovic and Phillips (2002), who suggest
that conglomerates are an efficient equilibrium outcome to certain business
opportunities, whereas for others standalone firms are better suited. The
equivalent for business groups would be that groups are an efficient out-
come for certain situations in which the appropriate counterfactual is not
necessarily stand alone firms but some other, not well specified, outcome.
Also related is the observation in Maurer and Haber (2006) that, when re-
strictions were imposed on related lending within Mexican business groups
in 1997, the result was a large decline in the size of the credit market, not
the emergence of a competitive equilibrium in which all firms could access
loans on equal footing.
Conceivably, the relevant counterfactual to business groups may change
with economic development - in early stages, in the absence of groups, the
plausible feasible alternative may well be underdevelopment and limited
market institutions. In more advanced economies, in the absence of busi-
ness groups, perhaps superior capital, labor, and other market institutions
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would develop; this conjecture has never been tested.
5.5 Groups and Macroeconomic Crises
Some studies relate corporate governance in business groups to the fi-
nancial crisis in East Asia (e.g., Corsetti et al., 1999; Johnson et al., 2000;
Mitton 2002; Kim and Lee 2003; Baek et al. 2004).48 Somewhat related is
the argument that crony capitalism enabled groups to borrow particularly
easily, and moral hazard problems associated with this may have precip-
itated the crisis (Charumilind et al., 2006). The popular press, especially
in South Korea, echoes these concerns. But are countries whose economies
are dominated by business groups more crisis prone than countries charac-
terized by stand alone companies? Is it the case that, if a few families con-
trol a large fraction of an economy through business groups, microeconomic
governance or management difficulties may turn into macroeconomic prob-
lems? On theoretical grounds, this is uncertain - links between group firms
may propagate adverse shocks, but mutual insurance within groups can
sometimes dampen them (Khanna and Yafeh 2005). Empirically, the ubiq-
uity of business groups may render such an exercise difficult, but this line
of research has potentially important welfare and policy implications.
To conclude, we believe that any blanket characterization of business
groups as either paragons or parasites would be unwarranted, both because
of the nature of the existing evidence and because of the continued existence
of unanswered puzzles. Part of the difficulty stems from the vast differences
across countries, groups, and time periods, and part from the multiple ef-
fects that groups tend to have. Progress is likely to result from casting a
broader net for relevant data; this includes paying attention to historical
data and evidence, using group origin as a relevant variable, and exploiting
time series variation. To us, business groups continue to be a fascinating
topic for research, still posing many interesting questions with implications
for a variety of important issues in economics and finance.
48 Claessens et al. (2006) is also related: they argue that within-group internal capital mar-
kets do not function well in crisis periods.
http://www.rei.unipg.it/rei/article/view/174 43
REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND INSTITUTIONS, Vol. 6, Issue 1 - Winter-Spring 2015, Article 2
References
Abramitzky, R., 2005. The Limits of Equality: An Economic Analysis of the
Israeli Kibbutz. Unpublished.
Acemoglu, D., Simon J., Mitton, T., 2005. Determinants of Vertical Integra-
tion: Finance, Contracts, and Regulation. NBER Working Paper 11424.
Aganin, A., Volpin, P., 2005. The History of Corporate Ownership in Italy.
In Morck, R., (Ed.), A History of Corporate Governance around the World:
Family Business Groups to Professional Managers, University of Chicago
Press, Chicago, pp.325-361.
Almeida, H., Wolfenzon, D., 2006. Should Business Groups Be Dismantled?
The Equilibrium Costs of Efficient Internal Capital Markets. Journal of Fi-
nancial Economics 79, 99-144. doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2005.02.001
Almeida, H., Wolfenzon, D., A Theory of Pyramidal Ownership and Family
Business Groups. Journal of Finance 41, 2637-2680.
Amatori, F., 1997. Growth via Politics: Business Groups Italian-Style. In
Shiba, T., Shimotani, M., (Eds.), Beyond the Firm: Business Groups in In-
ternational and Historical Perspective, Oxford University Press, Oxford,
pp. 109-134.
America Economica, 1997. Los Principales Conglomerados. Madrid, Dow
Jones.
Amihud, Y., and Baruch, L., 1981. Risk Reduction as a Managerial Mo-
tive for Conglomerate Mergers. Bell Journal of Economics 12, 605-617. doi:
10.2307/3003575
Amsden, A.H., 1989. Asia’s Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrial-
ization. Oxford University Press, New York and Oxford.
Aoki, M., 2001. Toward a Comparative Institutional Analysis. Comparative
Institutional Analysis Series, MIT Press, Cambridge and London.
Bae, K.-H., Jun-Koo K., Kim, J.-M. 2002. Tunneling or Value Added? Ev-
idence from Mergers by Korean Business Groups. Journal of Finance 57,
2695-2740. doi: 10.1111/1540-6261.00510
Baek, J.-S., Kang J.-K., Lee, I., 2006. Business Groups and Tunneling: Ev-
idence from Private Securities Offerings by Korean Chaebols. Journal of
Finance 61, 2415-2449. doi: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.01062.x
Baek, J.-S., Kang J.-K., Park, K.S., 2004. Corporate Governance and Firm
Value: Evidence from the Korean Financial Crisis. Journal of Financial Eco-
nomics 71, 265-313. doi: 10.1016/S0304-405X(03)00167-3
Copyright c© 2015 University of Perugia Electronic Press. All rights reserved 44
Khanna, Yafeh: Business Groups in Emerging Markets: Paragons or Parasites?
Baker, G.P., Montgomery, C.M., 1994. Conglomerates and LBO Associates:
A Comparison of Organizational Forms. Unpublished.
Barca, F., Becht, M., 2001. The Control of Corporate Europe. (Eds.) Oxford,
Oxford University Press.
Barontini, R., Caprio. L., 2005. The Effect of Family Control on Firm Value
and Performance: Evidence from Continental Europe. ECGI Finance Work-
ing Paper 88/2005.
Bebchuk, L.A., Kraakman, R., Triantis G.G., 2000. Stock Pyramids, Cross-
Ownership, and Dual Class Equity: The Mechanisms and Agency Costs
of Separating Control from Cash-Flow Rights. In Morck, R., (Eds.) Con-
centrated Corporate Ownership, NBER Conference Report series, Chicago
and London, University of Chicago Press, pp. 295-315.
Bennedsen, M., Nielsen, K.M., 2006. The Principle of Proportional Owner-
ship, Investor Protection and Firm Value in Western Europe. Unpublished.
Berger, P.G., Ofek, E., 1995. Diversification’s Effect on Firm Value. Journal of
Financial Economics 37, 39-65. doi: 10.1016/0304-405X(94)00798-6
Berle, A., Means, G., 1932. The Modern Corporation and Private Property.
New York, MacMillan.
Bernheim, B.D., Whinston, M.D., 1990. Multimarket Contact and Collusive
Behavior. RAND Journal of Economics 21, 1-26. doi: 10.2307/2555490
Bertrand, M., Johnson, S. Samphantharak, K., Schoar, A., 2004. Mixing Fam-
ily with Business: A Study of Thai Business Groups and the Families be-
hind Them. Unpublished.
Bertrand, M., Mehta, P., Mullainathan, S., 2002. Ferreting Out Tunneling: An
Application to Indian Business Groups. Quarterly Journal of Economics
117, 121-148. doi: 10.1162/003355302753399463
Bhagwati, J.N., 1982. Directly Unproductive, Profit-Seeking (DUP) Activi-
ties. Journal of Political Economy 90, 988-1002. doi: 10.1086/261104
Bianchi, M., Bianco, M., Enriques, L., 2001. Pyramidal Groups and the Sep-
aration between Ownership and Control in Italy. In F. Barca, F., Becht, M.,
(Eds.). The Control of Corporate Europe, Oxford, Oxford University Press,
pp. 154-187.
Bianco, M., Nicodano, G., 2006. Pyramidal Groups and Debt. European Eco-
nomic Review 50, 937-961. doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2004.11.001
http://www.rei.unipg.it/rei/article/view/174 45
REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND INSTITUTIONS, Vol. 6, Issue 1 - Winter-Spring 2015, Article 2
Borensztein, E., Lee, J.-W., 2002. Financial Crisis and Credit Crunch in Ko-
rea: Evidence from Firm-Level Data. Journal of Monetary Economics 49,
853-875. doi: 10.1016/S0304-3932(02)00116-2
Bunkanwanicha, P., Wiwattanakantang, Y., 2005. Tycoons Turned Leaders:
Investigating the Incentives for Holding Public Office. Unpublished.
Buysschaert, A., Deloof, M., Jegers, M., 2004. Equity Sales in Belgian Cor-
porate Groups: Expropriation of Minority Shareholders? A Clinical Study.
Journal of Corporate Finance 10, 81-103. doi:10.1016/S0929-1199(02)00047-
0
Campa, J.M., Kedia, S., 2002. Explaining the Diversification Discount. Jour-
nal of Finance 57, 1731-1762. doi:10.1111/1540-6261.00476
Campbell II, T.L., Keys, P.Y., 2002. Corporate Governance in South Ko-
rea: The Chaebol Experience. Journal of Corporate Finance 8, 373-391.
doi:10.1016/S0929-1199(01)00049-9
Cestone, G., Fumagalli, C., 2005. The Strategic Impact of Resource Flexibility
in Business Groups. RAND Journal of Economics 36, 193-214.
Chang, J.J., Shin, H.-H., 2005. Does the Family Portfolio Perform Better than
the Group Portfolio? Evidence from Korean Conglomerates. Unpublished.
Chang, S.-J., 2003a. Financial Crisis and Transformation of Korean Business
Groups: The Rise and Fall of Chaebols. Cambridge, New York and Mel-
bourne, Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511510861
Chang, S.-J., 2003b. Ownership Structure, Expropriation and Performance of
Group-Affiliated Companies in Korea. Academy of Management Journal
46, 238-254. doi:10.2307/30040617
Chang, S.-J., 2006. Korean Business Groups: The Financial Cri-
sis and the Restructuring of Chaebols. In Chang. S.-J., (Ed.),
Business Groups in East Asia: Financial Crisis, Restructuring,
and New Growth, Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 52-69.
doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199287345.003.0003
Chang, S.-J., Choi, U., 1988. Strategy, Structure and Performance of Korean
Business Groups: A Transactions Cost Approach. Journal of Industrial Eco-
nomics 37, 141-158. doi:10.2307/2098561
Chang, S.-J., Hong, J., 2000. Economic Performance of Group-Affiliated
Companies in Korea: Intra-group Resource Sharing and Internal
Business Transactions. Academy of Management Journal 43, 429-448.
doi:10.2307/1556403
Copyright c© 2015 University of Perugia Electronic Press. All rights reserved 46
Khanna, Yafeh: Business Groups in Emerging Markets: Paragons or Parasites?
Chang, S.-J., Hong, J., 2002. How Much Does the Business Group Matter in
Korea? Strategic Management Journal 23, 265-274. doi:10.1002/smj.224
Chari, A., Gupta, N, 2006. Incumbents and Protectionism: The Political
Economy of Foreign Entry Liberalization. Unpublished.
Charumilind, C., Kali, R., Wiwattanakantang, Y., 2006. Connected Lend-
ing: Thailand before the Financial Crisis. Journal of Business 79, 181-217.
doi:10.1086/497410
Cheung, Y.-L., Rau, P.R., Stouraitis, A., 2006. Tunneling, Prop-
ping, and Expropriation: Evidence from Connected Party Transac-
tions in Hong Kong. Journal of Financial Economics 82, 343-386.
doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.08.012
Chevalier, J., 2004. What Do We Know About Cross-Subsidization? Evi-
dence from Merging Firms. Advances in Economic Analysis and Policy 4,
1-27. doi:10.2202/1538-0637.1218
Choi, J.-P., Cowing, T.J., 1999. Firm Behavior and Group Affiliation: The
Strategic Role of Corporate Grouping for Korean Firms. Journal of Asian
Economics 10, 195-209. doi:10.1016/S1049-0078(99)00014-7
Chung, C.N., 2001. Markets, Culture and Institutions: The Emergence of
Large Business Groups in Taiwan, 1950s-1970s. Journal of Management
Studies 38, 719-745. doi:10.1111/1467-6486.00256
Chung, C.N., 2006. Beyond Guanxi: Network Contingencies in
Taiwanese Business Groups. Organization Studies 27, 461-489.
doi:10.1177/0170840605058230
Chung, C.N., Mahmood, I., 2006. Taiwanese Business Groups: Steady
Growth in Institutional Transition. In Chang, S-J., (Ed.). Business Groups
in East Asia: Financial Crisis, Restructuring, and New Growth, Oxford,
Oxford University Press, pp. 70-93.
Claessens, S., Djankov, S., Lang, L.H.P., 2000. The Separation of Ownership
and Control in East Asian Corporations. Journal of Financial Economics
58, 81-112. doi:10.1016/S0304-405X(00)00067-2
Claessens, S., Djankov, S., Fan, J.P.H., Lang, L.H.P., 2002. Disentangling the
Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholdings. Journal of Fi-
nance 57, 2741-2771. doi: 10.1111/1540-6261.00511
Claessens, S., Djankov, S., Fan, J.P.H., Lang, L.H.P., 2003. When Does
Corporate Diversification Matter to Productivity and Performance? Ev-
idence from East Asia. Pacific- Basin Finance Journal 11, 365-392.
doi:10.1016/S0927-538X(03)00029-5
http://www.rei.unipg.it/rei/article/view/174 47
REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND INSTITUTIONS, Vol. 6, Issue 1 - Winter-Spring 2015, Article 2
Claessens, S., Fan, J.P.H., Lang, L.H.P., 2006. The Benefits and Costs of
Group Affiliation: Evidence from East Asia. Emerging Markets Review 7,
1-26. doi:10.1016/j.ememar.2005.08.001
Clifford, M.L., 1994. Troubled Tiger: Businessmen, Bureaucrats, and Gener-
als in South Korea. New York, Sharpe.
Comment, R., Jarrell, G.A., 1995. Corporate Focus and Stock Returns. Jour-
nal of Financial Economics 37, 67-87. doi:10.1016/0304-405X(94)00777-X
Commonwealth of Australia, Department of Foreign Affairs, East Asia An-
alytical Unit. 1995. Overseas Chinese Business Networks in Asia. Parkes,
Commonwealth of Australia, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.
Corsetti, G., Pesenti, P., Roubini, N., 1999. What Caused the Asian Cur-
rency and Financial Crisis? Japan and the World Economy 11, 305-373.
doi:10.1016/S0922-1425(99)00019-5
Cull, R., Haber, S., Imai, M., 2006. All Bad, All of the Time? Related Lending
and Financial Development. Unpublished.
De Long, Bradford, J., 1991. Did J. P. Morgan’s Men Add Value? An
Economist’s Perspective on Financial Capitalism. In Temin. P., (Ed.). Inside
the Business Enterprise: Historical Perspectives on the Use of Information,
A National Bureau of Economic Research Conference Report Chicago and
London, University of Chicago Press, pp. 205-236.
Desai, M.A., Dyck, A., Zingales, L., 2007. Theft and Taxes. Journal of Finan-
cial Economics.
Dyck, A., Zingales, L., 2004. Private Benefits of Control: An Interna-
tional Comparison. Journal of Finance 59, 537-600. doi:10.1111/j.1540-
6261.2004.00642.x
Encaoua, D., Jacquemin, A., 1982. Organizational Efficiency and Monopoly
Power: The Case of French Industrial Groups. European Economic Review
19, 25-51. doi:10.1016/0014-2921(82)90004-6
Faccio, M., 2006. Politically Connected Firms. American Economic Review
96, 369-386. doi:10.1257/000282806776157704
Faccio, M., Lang, L.H.P., 2002. The Ultimate Ownership of Western
European Corporations. Journal of Financial Economics 65, 365-395.
doi:10.1016/S0304-405X(02)00146-0
Faccio, M., Lang, L.H.P., Young, L., 2001. Dividends and Expropriation.
American Economic Review 91, 54-78. doi:10.1257/aer.91.1.54
Copyright c© 2015 University of Perugia Electronic Press. All rights reserved 48
Khanna, Yafeh: Business Groups in Emerging Markets: Paragons or Parasites?
Fan, J.P.H., Huang, J., Morck, R., Yeung, B., 2006. Institutional Determinants
of Vertical Integration: Evidence from China. Unpublished.
Faure-Grimaud, A., Inderst, R., 2005. Conglomerate Entrenchment under
Optimal Financial Contracting. American Economic Review 95, 850-861.
doi:10.1257/0002828054201260
Fauver, L., Houston, J., Naranjo, A., 2003. Capital Market Development, In-
ternational Integration, Legal Systems, and the Value of Corporate Diversi-
fication: A Cross-Country Analysis. Journal of Financial and Quantitative
Analysis 38, 135-157. doi:10.2307/4126767
Fazzari, S.M., Hubbard, R.G., Petersen, B.C., 1988. Financing Constraints
and Corporate Investment. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1, 141-
195. doi:10.2307/2534426
Feenstra, R.C., Hamilton, G.G., 2006. Emergent Economies, Diver-
gent Paths: Economic Organization and International Trade in South
Korea and Taiwan. Structural Analysis in the Social Sciences se-
ries, vol. 29. Cambridge and New York, Cambridge University Press.
doi:10.1017/CBO9780511499586
Feenstra, R.C., Huang, D.-S., Hamilton, G.G., 2003. A Market-Power Based
Model of Business Groups. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organiza-
tion 51, 459-485. doi:10.1016/S0167-2681(02)00181-6
Ferris, S.P., Kim, K.A., Kitsabunnarat, P., 2003. The Costs (and Benefits?)
of Diversified Business Groups: The Case of Korean Chaebols. Journal of
Banking and Finance 27, 251-73. doi:10.1016/S0378-4266(01)00248-5
Fisman, R., 2001. Estimating the Value of Political Connections. American
Economic Review 91, 1095-1102. doi:10.1257/aer.91.4.1095
Fisman, R., Khanna, T., 2004. Facilitating Development: The
Role of Business Groups. World Development 32, 609-628.
doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2003.08.012
Fogel, K., 2006. Oligarchic Family Control, Social Economic Outcomes, and
the Quality of Government. Journal of International Business Studies 37,
603-622.
Franks, J., Mayer, C., Miyajima, H., 2006. Evolution of Ownership: The Cu-
rious Case of Japan. Unpublished.
Gerlach, M.L., 1992. Alliance Capitalism: The Social Organization of
Japanese Business. Berkeley and Oxford, University of California Press.
http://www.rei.unipg.it/rei/article/view/174 49
REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND INSTITUTIONS, Vol. 6, Issue 1 - Winter-Spring 2015, Article 2
Ghatak, M., Kali, R., 2001. Financially Interlinked Business Groups.
Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 10, 591-619.
doi:10.1162/105864001753356114
Ghemawat, P., Khanna, T., 1998. The Nature of Diversified Business Groups:
A Research Design and Two Case Studies. Journal of Industrial Economics
46, 35-61. doi:10.1111/1467-6451.00060
Gomes, A., 2000. Going Public without Governance: Managerial Reputation
Effects. Journal of Finance 55, 615-646. doi:10.1111/0022-1082.00221
Gomez, E. T., 2006. Malaysian Business Groups: The State and Cap-
ital Development in the Post-currency Crisis Period. In Chang, S.-
J., (Ed.), Business Groups in East Asia: Financial Crisis, Restructur-
ing and New Growth, Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 119-146.
doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199287345.003.0006
Gomez, E.T., Jomo, K.S., 1999. Malaysia’s Political Economy: Politics, Pa-
tronage and Profits. Second edition. Cambridge, Cambridge University
Press.
Gomez-Galvarriato, A. Forthcoming. The Political Economy of Protection-
ism: The Mexican Textile Industry, 1900-1950. In Edwards, S., (Ed.),
Growth, Institutions and Crises: Latin America from a Historic Perspec-
tive, Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
Gompers, P., Lerner, J., Scharfstein, D.S., 2005. Entrepreneurial Spawning:
Public Corporations and the Genesis of New Ventures, 1986 to 1999. Jour-
nal of Finance 60, 577-614. doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00740.x
Gopalan, R., Nanda, V.K., Seru, A., forthcoming. Reputation and Spillovers:
Evidence from Indian Business Groups. Journal of Financial Economics.
Granovetter, M., 2005. Business Groups and Social Organization. In Smelser,
N., Swedberg, R., (Eds.), The Handbook of Economic Sociology, Second
edition, Princeton, Princeton University Press, pp. 429-450.
Greif, A., 2006. Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy:
Lessons from Medieval Trade. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
doi:10.1017/CBO9780511791307
Greif, A., Kandel, E., 1995. Contract Enforcement Institutions: Historical
Perspective and Current Status in Russia. In Lazear, E., (Ed.), Economic
Transition in Eastern Europe and Russia: Realities of Reform, Stanford,
Hoover Institution Press, pp. 291-321.
Guriev, S., Rachinsky, A., 2005. The Role of Oligarchs in Rus-
sian Capitalism. Journal of Economic Perspectives 19, 131-150.
doi:10.1257/0895330053147994
Copyright c© 2015 University of Perugia Electronic Press. All rights reserved 50
Khanna, Yafeh: Business Groups in Emerging Markets: Paragons or Parasites?
Hadley, E.M., 1970. Antitrust in Japan. Princeton, Princeton University
Press.
Hamilton, G.G., 1997. Organization and Market Processes in Taiwan’s Cap-
italist Economy. In Orru, M., Biggart, N.W., Hamilton, G.G., (Eds.). The
Economic Organization of East Asian Capitalism, Thousand Oaks, Calif,;
London and New Delhi, Sage Publications, pp. 237-293.
Hamilton, G.G., Feenstra, R.C., 1997. Varieties of Hierarchies and Markets:
An Introduction. In Orru, M., Biggart, N.W., Hamilton, G.G., (Eds.), The
Economic Organization of East Asian Capitalism, Thousand Oaks, Calif,
London and New Delhi, Sage Publications, pp. 55-94.
Hanani, A., 2006. Indonesian Business Groups: The Crisis in Progress. In
Chang, S.-J., (Ed.), Business Groups in East Asia: Financial Crisis, Restruc-
turing, and New Growth, Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 179-204.
doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199287345.003.0008
Holmen, M, HA˜¶gfeldt, P., 2005. Pyramidal Discounts: Tunneling or
Agency Costs? Unpublished.
Hoshi, T., Kashyap, A., Scharfstein, D.S., 1991. Corporate Structure, Liquid-
ity, and Investment: Evidence from Japanese Industrial Groups. Quarterly
Journal of Economics 106, 33-60. doi:10.2307/2937905
Huang, Y., 2003. Selling China: Foreign Direct Investment during the Re-
form Era. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Hubbard, R.G., Palia, D., 1999. A Reexamination of the Conglomerate
Merger Wave in the 1960s: An Internal Capital Markets View. Journal of
Finance 54, 1131-1152. doi:10.1111/0022-1082.00139
Joh, S.W., 2003. Corporate Governance and Firm Profitability: Evidence
from Korea before the Economic Crisis. Journal of Financial Economics 68,
287-322. doi:10.1016/S0304-405X(03)00068-0
Johnson, J., 1997. Russia’s Emerging Financial- Industrial Groups. Post-
Soviet Affairs 13, 333-365.
Johnson, S., Boone, P., Breach, A., Friedman, E., 2000. Corporate Governance
in the Asian Financial Crisis. Journal of Financial Economics 58, 141-186.
doi:10.1016/S0304-405X(00)00069-6
Johnson, S., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., 2000. Tunneling.
American Economic Review 90, 22-27. doi:10.1257/aer.90.2.22
Johnson, S., Mitton, T., 2003. Cronyism and Capital Controls: Evidence from
Malaysia. Journal of Financial Economics 67, 351-382. doi:10.1016/S0304-
405X(02)00255-6
http://www.rei.unipg.it/rei/article/view/174 51
REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND INSTITUTIONS, Vol. 6, Issue 1 - Winter-Spring 2015, Article 2
Jones, G., 2000. Merchants to Multinationals: British Trading Companies in
the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries. Oxford and New York, Oxford
University Press.
Jones, G., Khanna, T., 2006. Bringing History (Back) into Interna-
tional Business. Journal of International Business Studies 37, 453-468.
doi:10.1057/palgrave.jibs.8400198
Kali, R., 1999. Endogenous Business Networks. Journal of Law, Economics,
and Organization 15, 615-636. doi:10.1093/jleo/15.3.615
Kali, R. 2003. Business Groups, the Financial Market and Modernization.
Economics of Transition 11, 671-696. doi: 10.1111/j.0967-0750.2003.00160.x
Kang, C. -K. 1997., Diversification Process and the Ownership Structure of
Samsung Chaebol. In Shiba T. Shimotani, M., (Eds.) Beyond the Firm: Busi-
ness Groups in International and Historical Perspective, Oxford, Oxford
University Press, 31-58.
Karademir, B., Danisman, A., 2006. Business Groups and Media in Emerg-
ing Economies: A Co-evolutionary Approach to Their Interrelationship in
Turkey, 1960-2005. Paper Presented at the 23rd European Group for Orga-
nizational Studies Colloquium.
Bahattin, K., A˜zgen, H., Osborn, R.N., Yaprak, A., 2005. The Co-evolution
of Institutional Environments, Markets, Organizational Capabilities, and
Organization Strategies: A Historical and Comparative Study of Turkish
Family Holdings. Proceedings of the 21st European Group for Organiza-
tional Studies Colloquium.
Keister, L.A., 1998. Engineering Growth: Business Group Structure and
Firm Performance in China’s Transition Economy. American Journal of So-
ciology 104, 404-440. doi: 10.1086/210043
Keister, L.A., 2004. Chinese Business Groups: The Structure and Impact of
Interfirm Relations during Economic Development. Oxford, Oxford Uni-
versity Press.
Khanna, T., 2000. Business Groups and Social Welfare in Emerging Mar-
kets: Existing Evidence and Unanswered Questions. European Economic
Review 44, 748-761. doi: 10.1016/S0014-2921(99)00059-8
Khanna, T., Palepu, K., 1997. Why Focused Strategies May Be Wrong for
Emerging Markets. Harvard Business Review 75, 41-51.
Khanna, T., Palepu, K., 1999a. Policy Shocks, Market Intermediaries,
and Corporate Strategy: The Evolution of Business Groups in Chile
and India. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 8, 271-310.
doi:10.1257/0895330053147994
Copyright c© 2015 University of Perugia Electronic Press. All rights reserved 52
Khanna, Yafeh: Business Groups in Emerging Markets: Paragons or Parasites?
Khanna, T., Palepu, K., 1999b. The Right Way to Restructure Conglomerates
in Emerging Markets. Harvard Business Review 77, 125-134.
Khanna, T., Palepu, K., 2000a. Emerging Market Business Groups, Foreign
Intermediaries, and Corporate Governance. In R. Morck (Ed.) A History
of Corporate Governance around the World: Family Business Groups to
Professional Managers, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, pp. 265-92.
Khanna, T., Palepu, K., 2000b. Is Group Affiliation Profitable in Emerging
Markets? An Analysis of Diversified Indian Business Groups. Journal of
Finance 55, 867-891. doi: 10.1111/0022-1082.00229
Khanna, T., Palepu, K., 2000c. The Future of Business Groups in Emerging
Markets: Long-Run Evidence from Chile. Academy of Management Jour-
nal 43, 268-285. doi: 10.2307/1556395
Khanna, T., Palepu, K., 2005. The Evolution of Concentrated Ownership in
India: Broad Patterns and a History of the Indian Software Industry. In R.
Morck (Ed.) A History of Corporate Governance around the World: Family
Business Groups to Professional Managers, University of Chicago Press,
Chicago, pp. 283-320.
Khanna, T., Palepu, K., Wu, D.M., 1995. The House of Tata, 1995: The Next
Generation (A). Harvard Business School Case 9, 798-037.
Khanna, T., Rivkin, J.W., 2001. Estimating the Performance Effects of Busi-
ness Groups in Emerging Markets. Strategic Management Journal 22, 45-
74. doi: 10.1002/1097-0266(200101)22:1¡45::AID-SMJ147¿3.0.CO;2-F
Khanna, T., Thomas, C, 2004. What Type of Control Group Causes Stock
Price Synchronicity? Unpublished.
Khanna, T., Yafeh, Y., 2005. Business Groups and Risk Sharing around the
World. Journal of Business 78, 301-40. doi: 10.1086/426527
Kim, B., Inmoo L., 2003. Agency Problems and Performance of Korean
Companies during the Asian Financial Crisis: Chaebol vs. Non- Chae-
bol Firms. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal 11, 327-348. doi: 10.1016/S0927-
538X(03)00027-1
Kim, E.M., 1997, Big Business, Strong State: Collusion and Conflict in South
Korean Development, 1960-1990. Albany, SUNY Press.
Kim, E., 2006. The Impact of Family Ownership and Capital Structures
on Productivity Performance of Korean Manufacturing Firms: Corporate
Governance and the ’Chaebol Problem.’ Journal of the Japanese and Inter-
national Economies 20, 209-233. doi: 10.1016/j.jjie.2005.02.001
http://www.rei.unipg.it/rei/article/view/174 53
REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND INSTITUTIONS, Vol. 6, Issue 1 - Winter-Spring 2015, Article 2
Kim, S-J., 2004. Bailout and Conglomeration. Journal of Financial Economics
71, 315-347. doi: 10.1016/S0304-405X(03)00191-0
Kim, W., Lim, Y., Sung, T.. 2004. What Determines the Ownership Structure
of Business Conglomerates? On the Cash Flow Rights of Korea’s Chaebol.
ECGI Finance Working Paper, no. 051/2004.
Kompass Indonesia. 1996. Top Companies and Big Groups in Indonesia.
Jakarta: Kompass Indonesia.
Krueger, A.O. 1974. The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society.
American Economic Review 64, 291-303.
Kurgan-Van Hentenryk, G., 1997. Structure and Strategy of Belgian Busi-
ness Groups (1920-1990). In Shiba T. Shimotani, M., (Eds.) Beyond the Firm:
Business Groups in International and Historical Perspective, Oxford Uni-
versity Press, Oxford, pp. 88-108.
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., 1999. Corporate
Ownership around the World. Journal of Finance 54, 471-517.
hrefhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1111/0022-1082.00115doi: 10.1111/j.1540-
6261.1997.tb02727.x
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R.W., 1997.
Legal Determinants of External Finance. Journal of Finance 52,
1131-1150. hrefhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb02727.xdoi:
10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb02727.x
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R.W., 1998.
Law and Finance. Journal of Political Economy 106, 1113-1155.
hrefhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1086/250042doi: 10.1086/250042
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Zamarripa, G., 2003. Re-
lated Lending. Quarterly Journal of Economics 118, 231-
268. hrefhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1162/00335530360535199doi:
10.1162/00335530360535199
Lamoreaux, N.R., 1994. Insider Lending: Banks, Personal Con-
nections, and Economic Development in Industrial New Eng-
land. NBER Series on Long- term Factors in Economic Develop-
ment. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge; New York and
Melbourne. hrefhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511582523doi:
10.1017/CBO9780511582523
Lang, L.H.P., Stulz, R.M., 1994. Tobin’s Q, Corporate Diversification,
and Firm Performance. Journal of Political Economy 102, 1248-1280.
doi:10.1086/261970
Copyright c© 2015 University of Perugia Electronic Press. All rights reserved 54
Khanna, Yafeh: Business Groups in Emerging Markets: Paragons or Parasites?
Lee C.H., Keun, L., Kangkook L., 2002. Chaebols, Financial Liberalization
and Economic Crisis: Transformation of Quasi-Internal Organization in
Korea. Asian Economic Journal 16, 17-35. doi: 10.1111/1467-8381.00140
Lee,K., Lee, D.G., 2002. The Dark Side of Internal Capital Allocation: The
Case of Korean Chaebols. Seoul Journal of Economics, 15, 321-368.
Lee, K., Peng, M., Lee, K., 2001. Institutions and Changing Performance of
Corporate Groups: The Case of the Chaebols in Korea. Unpublished.
Lee, K., Ryu, K., Yoon, J.M., 2000. Productive Efficiency of Chaebols and
Non- Chaebol Firms in Korea: Stochastic Production Frontier Estimation
Using Panel Data. Unpublished.
Leff, N.H., 1976. Capital Markets in Less Developed Countries: The Group
Principle. In McKinnon, R., (Ed.), Money and Finance in Economic Growth
and Development: Essays in Honour of Edward S. Shaw, Decker Press,
New York, pp.97-122.
Leff, N.H., 1978. Industrial Organization and Entrepreneurship in the De-
veloping Countries: The Economic Groups. Economic Development and
Cultural Change 26, 661-675. doi: 10.1086/451052
Leuz, C., Lins,K.V, Warnock, F.E., 2006. Do Foreigners Invest Less in Poorly
Governed Firms? NBER Working Papers, no. 12222.
Leuz, C., Oberholzer-Gee, F., 2006. Political Relationships, Global Financing,
and Corporate Transparency: Evidence from Indonesia. Journal of Finan-
cial Economics 81, 411-439. doi: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2005.06.006
Luo, X., Chung, C., Forthcoming. Keeping It All in the Family: The Role
of the Particularistic Relationships in Business Group Performance during
Institutional Transition. Administrative Science Quarterly.
Majluf, N., Abarca, N., RodrA˜guez, D., Fuentes, L.A., 1995. The Ownership
of Economic Groups in Chile. Unpublished.
Maksimovic, V., Phillips, G., 2002. Do Conglomerate Firms Allocate Re-
sources Inefficiently across Industries? Theory and Evidence. Journal of
Finance 57, 721-767. doi: 10.1111/1540-6261.00440
Maman, D., 2002. The Emergence of Business Groups: Israel and
South Korea Compared. Organization Studies 23 737-758. doi:
10.1177/0170840602235003
Mango, A., 2004. The Turks Today. Overlook Press, New York.
Manos, R., Murinde, V., Green, C.J., 2004. Business Groups and Capital
Structure: Evidence from Indian Firms. Unpublished.
http://www.rei.unipg.it/rei/article/view/174 55
REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND INSTITUTIONS, Vol. 6, Issue 1 - Winter-Spring 2015, Article 2
Marisetty, V.B., Subrahmanyam, M.G., 2006. Group Affiliation and the Per-
formance of Initial Public Offerings in the Indian Stock Market. Unpub-
lished.
Martin, J.D., Sayrak, A., 2003. Corporate Diversification and Shareholder
Value: A Survey of Recent Literature. Journal of Corporate Finance 9, 37-
57. doi: 10.1016/S0929-1199(01)00053-0
Matsusaka, J.G., 1993. Takeover Motives during the Conglomerate Merger
Wave. RAND Journal of Economics 24, 357-379. doi: 10.2307/2555963
Maurer, N., 1999. Banks and Entrepreneurs in Porfirian Mexico: Inside Ex-
ploitation or Sound Business Strategy? Journal of Latin American Studies,
31(2): 331-61. doi: 10.1017/S0022216X99005301
Maurer, N., Haber, S., 2006. Related Lending and Economic Performance:
Evidence from Mexico, 1888-1913. Unpublished.
Maurer, N., Sharma, T., 2001. Enforcing Property Rights through Reputa-
tion: Mexico’s Early Industrialization, 1878-1913. Journal of Economic His-
tory 61, 950-973. doi: 10.1017/S0022050701042048
McDermott, G.A., 2002. Embedded Politics: Industrial Networks and Insti-
tutional Change in Postcommunism. University of Michigan Press, Ann
Arbor.
McGregor, 1998. McGregor’s Who Owns Whom in South Africa. McGregor
Publishing, Auckland Park.
Mitton, T., 2002. A Cross-Firm Analysis of the Impact of Corporate Gover-
nance on the East Asian Financial Crisis. Journal of Financial Economics
64, 215-241.
Miyajima, H., Kuroki, F., Forthcoming. The Unwinding of Cross-
Shareholding: Causes, Effects, and Implications. In Aoki, M., Jackson, G.,
Miyajima, H., (Eds.), Corporate Governance in Japan: Institutional Change
and Organizational Diversity. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Mobarak, A.M., and Purbasari, D., 2005. Political Trade Protection in Devel-
oping Countries: Firm Level Evidence from Indonesia. Unpublished.
Montgomery, C.A., 1994. Corporate Diversification. Journal of Economic
Perspectives 8, 163-178. doi: 10.1257/jep.8.3.163
Morck, R., 2005. How to Eliminate Pyramidal Business Groups: The Double
Taxation of Intercorporate Dividends and other Incisive Uses of Tax Pol-
icy. In Poterba, J., (Ed.), Tax Policy and the Economy, Vol. 19, MIT Press,
Cambridge and London, pp. 135-179.
Copyright c© 2015 University of Perugia Electronic Press. All rights reserved 56
Khanna, Yafeh: Business Groups in Emerging Markets: Paragons or Parasites?
Morck, R., Nakamura M., 2005. A Frog in a Well Knows Nothing of the
Ocean: A History of Corporate Ownership in Japan. In Morck, R., (Ed.),
A History of Corporate Governance around the World: Family Business
Groups to Professional Managers. University of Chicago Press, Chicago,
pp. 367-459.
Morck, R., Percy, M., Tian G.Y., Yeung, B.,. 2005. The Rise and Fall of the
Widely Held Firm: A History of Corporate Ownership in Canada. In
Morck, R., (Ed.), A History of Corporate Governance around the World:
Family Business Groups to Professional Managers. University of Chicago
Press, Chicago, pp. 65-140. doi: 10.7208/chicago/9780226536835.001.0001
Morck, R., Shleifer, A., Vishny R.W., 1990. Do Managerial Objectives Drive
Bad Acquisitions? Journal of Finance 45, 31-48. doi: 10.1111/j.1540-
6261.1990.tb05079.x
Morck, R., David, K., Stangeland, A., Yeung, B., 2000. Inherited Wealth, Cor-
porate Control, and Economic Growth: The Canadian Disease? In Morck,
R. (Ed.) Concentrated Corporate Ownership. NBER Conference Report se-
ries. University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, pp. 319-369.
Morck, R., Wolfenzon, D., Yeung, B., 2005. Corporate Governance, Eco-
nomic Entrenchment, and Growth. Journal of Economic Literature 43, 655-
720. doi: 10.2307/3003575
Morck, R., Yeung, B., 2005. Dividend Taxation and Corporate
Governance. Journal of Economic Perspectives 19, 163-180. doi:
10.1257/089533005774357752
Morikawa, H., 1992. Zaibatsu: The Rise and Fall of Family Enterprise
Groups in Japan. University of Tokyo Press, Tokyo.
Munshi, K., Rosenzweig, M., 2005. Economic Development and the Decline
of Rural and Urban Community-Based Networks. Economics of Transition
13, 427-443. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0351.2005.00231.x
Musacchio, A., 2004. Law and Finance in Historical Perspective: Politics,
Bankruptcy Law and Corporate Governance in Brazil, 1850-2002. Unpub-
lished.
Nenova, T., 2003. The Value of Corporate Voting Rights and Control: A
Cross-Country Analysis. Journal of Financial Economics 68, 325-351. doi:
10.2307/3003575
Nicodano, G., 2003. Bankruptcy Risk: Are Business Groups More Efficient
than Conglomerates and Stand-Alone Units? Unpublished.
http://www.rei.unipg.it/rei/article/view/174 57
REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND INSTITUTIONS, Vol. 6, Issue 1 - Winter-Spring 2015, Article 2
Ohkawa, K., Rosovsky, H., 1973. Japanese Economic Growth: Trend Accel-
eration in the Twentieth Century. Stanford University Press, Stanford.
Okabe, M., 2002. Cross Shareholdings in Japan: A New Unified Perspective
of the Economic System. Elgar, Cheltenham, U.K.
Orru`, M., Biggart, N.W., Hamilton, G.G., 1997. The Economic Organization
of East Asian Capitalism. Thousand Oaks, Sage Publications, London and
New Delhi.
Perkins, S., Morck, R., Yeung, B., 2006. Innocents Abroad: Failure Rates
of International Joint Ventures with Firms in Pyramidal Groups. Unpub-
lished.
Perotti, E.C., Gelfer, S., 2001. Red Barons or Robber Barons? Governance and
Investment in Russian Financial-Industrial Groups. European Economic
Review 45, 1601-1617. doi: 10.1016/S0014-2921(00)00097-0
Piramal, G., 1998. Business Legends. Viking Penguin, New Delhi.
Polsiri, P., Wiwattanakantang, Y., 2006. Thai Business Groups: Crisis and
Restructuring. In Chang. S., (Ed.) Business Groups in East Asia: Financial
Crisis, Restructuring, and New Growth. Oxford University Press, Oxford,
pp. 147-178. doi: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199287345.003.0007
Rajan, R., Servaes, H., Zingales, L.. 2000. The Cost of Diversity: The Diversi-
fication Discount and Inefficient Investment. Journal of Finance 55, 35-80.
doi: 10.1111/0022-1082.00200
Rajan, R., Zingales, L. 2003. Saving Capitalism from the Capitalists: Un-
leashing the Power of Financial Markets to Create Wealth and Spread Op-
portunity. Random House, New York.
Roberts, J.G., 1973. Mitsui, Three Centuries of Japanese Business. Weather-
hill, New York.
Samphantharak, K., 2003. Internal Capital Markets in Business Groups. Un-
published.
Scharfstein, D.S., Stein, J.C., 2000. The Dark Side of Internal Capital Markets:
Divisional Rent-Seeking and Inefficient Investment. Journal of Finance 55,
2537-2564. doi: 10.1111/0022-1082.00299
Schwarz, A., 1994. A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia in the 1990s. Boulder:
Westview Press, St. Leonards, New South Wales.
Shin, H., Park, Y.S., 1999. Financing Constraints and Internal Capital Mar-
kets: Evidence from Korean Chaebols.’ Journal of Corporate Finance 5, 169-
191. doi: 10.1016/S0929-1199(99)00002-4
Copyright c© 2015 University of Perugia Electronic Press. All rights reserved 58
Khanna, Yafeh: Business Groups in Emerging Markets: Paragons or Parasites?
Shin, H., Stulz R.M., 1998. Are Internal Capital Markets Efficient? Quarterly
Journal of Economics 113, 531-552. doi: 10.2307/3003575
Shleifer, A., Vishny, R.W., 1997. A Survey of Corporate Governance. Journal
of Finance 52, 737-783. doi: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb04820.x
Shleifer, A., Wolfenzon, D., 2002. Investor Protection and Equity Mar-
kets. Journal of Financial Economics 66, 3-27. doi: 10.1016/S0304-
405X(02)00149-6
Siegel, J., 2006. Contingent Political Capital and International Alliances: Ev-
idence from South Korea. Unpublished.
Stark, D., 1996. Recombinant Property in East European Capitalism. Amer-
ican Journal of Sociology 101, 993-1027. doi: 10.1086/230786
Steers, R.M., 1999. Made in Korea: Chung Ju Yung and the Rise of Hyundai.
Routledge, New York.
Strachan, H.W., 1976. Family and other Business Groups in Economic De-
velopment: The Case of Nicaragua. Prager, New York.
Suzigan, W., Annibal V.V., 1997. Industrial Policy in Brazil. UNICAMP,
Campinas.
Tara Siam Ltd. 1997. Thai Business Groups. Bangkok. Tara Siam Business
Information Limited.
Tripathi, D., 2004. The Oxford Encyclopedia of Indian Business. Oxford Uni-
versity Press, Oxford.
Tsui-Auch, L.S., 2005. Unpacking Regional Ethnicity and the Strength of Ties
in Shaping Ethnic Entrepreneurship. Organization Studies 26, 1189-1216.
doi: 10.1177/0170840605055343
Tsui-Auch, L.S., 2006. Singaporean Business Groups: The Role of the State
and Capital in Singapore Inc. In Chang, S., (Ed.), Business Groups in East
Asia: Financial Crisis, Restructuring, and New Growth, Oxford University
Press, Oxford, 94-115. doi: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199287345.003.0005
Ungki, L., Chang-Soo, K., 2005. Determinants of Ownership Structure: An
Empirical Study of the Korean Conglomerates. Pacific-Basin Finance Jour-
nal 13, 1-28. doi: 10.1016/j.pacfin.2003.11.001
Villalonga, B., 2004a. Diversification Discount or Premium? New Evidence
from the Business Information Tracking Series. Journal of Finance 59, 479-
506. doi: 10.2307/3003575
http://www.rei.unipg.it/rei/article/view/174 59
REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND INSTITUTIONS, Vol. 6, Issue 1 - Winter-Spring 2015, Article 2
Villalonga, B., 2004b. Does Diversification Cause The ’Diversification Dis-
count’? Financial Management 33, 5-27.
Weinstein, D.E., Yishay Y., 1995. Japan’s Corporate Groups: Collusive or
Competitive? An Empirical Investigation of Keiretsu Behavior. Journal of
Industrial Economics 43, 359-376. doi: 10.2307/2950549
White, L.J., 1974. Industrial Concentration and Economic Power in Pakistan.
Princeton University Press, Princeton.
Whited, T.M., 2001. Is It Inefficient Investment That Causes the Diversi-
fication Discount? Journal of Finance 56, 1667-1691. doi: 10.1111/0022-
1082.00385
Yafeh, Y., 1995. Corporate Ownership, Profitability, and Bank-Firm
Ties: Evidence from the American Occupation Reforms in Japan.
Journal of the Japanese and International Economies 9, 154-173. doi:
10.1006/jjie.1995.1009
Yafeh, Y., 2003. An International Perspective of Corporate Groups and Their
Prospects. In: Blomstrom, M., Corbett, J., Hayashi, F., Kashyap, A., (Eds.),
Structural Impediments to Growth in Japan. University of Chicago Press,
Chicago, pp. 259-284. doi: 10.7208/chicago/9780226060231.003.0010
Yaprak, A., Bahattin, K., Hu¨seyin, O¨., Richard N.O., 2004. Complex Con-
figuations in the Turkish Economy. Proceedings of the Academy of Inter-
national Business Annual Meeting.
Yurtoglu, B.B., 2000. Ownership, Control and Performance of Turkish Listed
Firms. Empirica 27, 193-222. doi: 0.1023/A:1026557203261
Copyright c© 2015 University of Perugia Electronic Press. All rights reserved 60
